Abstract-Model-free learning has been considered as an efficient tool for designing control mechanisms when the model of the system environment or the interaction between the decisionmaking entities is not available as a-priori knowledge. With model-free learning, the decision-making entities adapt their behaviors based on the reinforcement through their interaction with the environment, and are able to (implicitly) build the understanding of the system through try-and-error mechanisms. Such a characteristics of model-free learning is highly in accordance with the requirement of cognition and intelligence for wireless devices in cognitive wireless networks. Recently, model-free learning has been considered as one key implementation approach to adaptive, self-organized network control in cognitive wireless networks. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey on the applications of the state-of-art model-free learning mechanisms in wireless networks. A systematic overview of the learning algorithms in the domains of both multi-agent systems and multi-player games is provided. Furthermore, the applications of model-free learning to various problems in wireless networks are discussed with the focus on how the learning mechanisms helps to provide the solutions to these problems and improve the network performance over the existing model-based, non-adaptive methods. Finally, a broad spectrum of challenges and open issues are discussed to offer a guideline for the future research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The original concept of Cognitive Radio (CR) was first proposed a little over one decade ago [1] . In a broad sense, CR is defined as a prototypical radio framework that adopts a radio-knowledge-representation language for the softwaredefined radio devices to autonomously learn about the dynamics of radio environments and adapt to changes of application/protocol requirements. In recent years, Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) have been widely recognized from a highlevel perspective as an intelligent wireless communication system. A device in a CRN is expected to be aware of its surrounding environment and uses the methodology of understanding-by-building to reconfigure the operational parameters in real-time, in order to achieve the optimal network performance [2] , [3] . In the framework of CRNs, the following abilities are typically emphasized:
Wenbo Wang and Andres Kwasinski are with the Department of Computer Engineering, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY 14623 USA (email: wxw4213@rit.edu, axkeec@rit.edu).
Dusit Niyato is with the School of Computer Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798 (email: dniyato@ntu.edu.sg).
Zhu Han is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Houston, TX 77004 USA (email: zhan2@uh.edu).
• radio-environment awareness by sensing (cognition) in a time-varying radio environment; • autonomous, adaptive reconfigurability by learning (intelligence); • cost-efficient and scalable network configuration.
In recent years, many studies on the CR technologies focus on the objective of enhancing spectrum efficiency with the functionality of radio-environment cognition. This leads to the introduction of "Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) networks" [4] , which are featured by the two-layer structure in spectrum access of the PHY-MAC layer. In the literature, "DSA networks" is frequently considered as a terminology that is interchangeable with "CR networks" [3] . However, from the perspective of autonomous and cost-efficient network configuration, the objective of self-organized reconfigurability becomes more fundamental in the CR technologies, since it shapes the mechanisms of network control and transmission behavior acquisition. By emphasizing such an objective, many network management mechanisms can be considered as acquiring a certain level of cognition-intelligence ability, as long as they are able to dynamically characterize the situation of the decision-making entities in the network, and accordingly infer the proper transmission strategies. From a broader point of view, the border between a pure CRN (namely, the CRN in the sense of DSA networks) and a conventional wireless network is gradually diminishing [5] , [6] . For future wireless networks, the concept of "cognition" and "intelligence" can be re-defined as autonomous transmission policy adaptation according to awareness capability of CR devices in numerous dimensions across networking protocol stacks [6] . Figure 1 provides an overview on the relationship between the perceivable network states and the configurable, cross-layer network functionalities in the cognitive wireless networks.
Considering the distributed nature of wireless networks, a good CR-based framework of autonomous network configuration in time-varying environments needs to address the following questions: 1) How to properly configure the transmission parameters with limited ability of network modeling or environment observation? 2) How to coordinate the distributed transmitting entities (e.g., end users and base stations) with limited resources for information exchange? 3) How to guarantee the network convergence under the condition of interest conflicts among transmitting entities? Generally, questions 1) and 2) are based on the consideration that in the practical scenarios, the abilities of environment perception by the network devices may be limited and/or of different levels. Therefore, the solution to the problems raised by questions 1) and 2) requires that a decision-making mechanism should be able to learn the transmission policies without explicitly knowing the accurate mathematical model of the networks beforehand. Meanwhile, questions 2) and 3) are raised by the basic requirement of a self-organized, distributed control system. Only by addressing questions 2) and 3) can the network configuration process be efficient in both information acquisition and policy computation. With questions 1), 2) and 3) in mind, it is now emphasized that the stable operation point of the network should be achieved under the condition of information incompleteness/locality. Especially, controlling-bylearning without the need for acquiring the a-priori knowledge of the network model is highly desirable. As a result, in regard to the requirement of intelligent, model-free decision-making, it will be no more proper to resort to the tools of model-free learning theory [7] , [8] in the framework of CR technologies. In the context of adaptive control, model-based learning aims at finding control policies based on the system models built off-line [7] . By contrast, model-free learning aims at finding control policies with only limited knowledge of the system model or even with no pre-known model when learning begins. With model-free learning, it is usually not required to explicitly learn a system model in order to derive the controller. Recently, the confluence of adaptive control, game theory and model-free learning has been considered to be leading to a promising approach to the solutions of the various network control/resource allocation problems [9] , [10] . In return, the development of the recent network technologies, such as heterogeneous networks and DSA networks, are increasingly demanding more efficient learning mechanisms to be implemented for an adaptive, self-organized solution. However, although from the single-device point of view, the cognition-decision paradigm (see Figure 2 ) has been proposed for more than a decade [1] , there still exist a number of challenging issues that are to be addressed in the application of learning. In this paper, we will provide a thorough review of the current development of model-free learning algorithms in the context of the cognitive wireless networks. We hope this paper will serve as a guide for the researchers who are exploring the problem of learning, especially in wireless networks in the future.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey on the applications of model-free learning by the cognitive devices in wireless networks. In order to focus on the capabilities of learning-by-building in the process of network control policy adaptation, we organize the survey based on the category of learning mechanisms. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the background and the preliminary concepts of learning in both distributed, multiagent systems and games. In Section III, the reviews of different applications of learning in the existing works are provided in the order of the network formulation that they are based on. In Section IV, some important open issues are outlined the future research directions are provided. Finally, we summarize and conclude the paper in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND: MODEL-FREE LEARNING IN THE DOMAINS OF DISTRIBUTED CONTROL AND GAME THEORY
Although the applications of model-free learning in wireless networks became more commonplace in the early 2000s, the fundamental development of the model-free learning theory can be traced back much earlier, to the 1980s [11] , [12] . In this section, we provide a necessary introduction of the general-purpose learning methods that are developed in the domains of distributed control and game theory. To assist our discussion about learning techniques applied to cognitive wireless networks, we categorize the learning methods by the degree of coupling among the decision-making agents. In what follows, we will briefly introduce the general-purpose learning algorithms that are built upon the decision-making models of single-agent systems, loosely coupled multi-agent systems and game-based multi-agent systems, respectively. Before proceeding to more details of the learning mechanisms, we first provide a high-level overview of the decision-making models in Table I .
A. Single-Agent Strategy Learning
In the context of distributed control and robotics, singleagent learning has been considered as the most fundamental class of the strategy-learning methods. Frequently, the terminologies "reinforcement learning" and "model-free learning" Fig. 3 . The OODA loop, often known as the cognition cycle [1] .
are (partially) used interchangeably to refer to the decisionmaking process of a single agent, which learns to improve its performance by merely observing the state changes in its operational environment and the utility feedback that it received after taking an action. In the recent surveys on reinforcementlearning theory and its applications [13] , [14] , such a decisionlearning process is described by an abstract model, namely, the Observe-Orient-Decision-Action (OODA) loop [4] . The OODA loop ( Figure 3 ) can be considered as a generalized model of the cognition cycle in the context of cognitive wireless networks (Figure 2) , and it provides a generic description of the information flow in the intelligent decision-making process. However, it is the task of the specific reinforcementlearning methods to define the rules of agent behaviors that guide the interaction with the to-be-explored environment. Since in most of the practical scenarios, a learning agent needs to deal with environment uncertainty. In the literature, a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [15] become a prevalent tool for abstracting the model of the agent-environment interaction. Based on the MDP framework, various model-free learning methods such as Temporal Difference (TD) learning [16] and learning automata [17] can be adopted to define the behavior rules of an agent. The standard (single-agent) MDP model is used to describe a stochastic Single-Agent System (SAS). Mathematically, a single-agent MDP is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Single-agent MDP [8] In the MDPs, the underlying environment is a stationary stochastic process, and the consequences of the decisions can be probabilistic. The goal of a decision-learning agent is to find the proper stationary policy, π = Pr(a|s) that probabilistically maps the states to the actions so that the accumulated long-term utility of the agent is optimized. With respect to different applications, the objectives of the MDPs may appear in different forms. In this survey, we will mainly consider two types of the infinite-horizon objectives [7] as follows:
• the discounted-reward MDP with the discounting factor β ∈ [0, 1]:
• the average-reward MDP:
Both types of MDPs can be represented in the form of the Bellman optimality equation. For the discounted-reward MDP, the Bellman equation can be either represented by the statevalue function starting from state s under policy π:
or the state-action value function (Q-function) that starts from taking action a at state s and follows policy π thereafter: 
In order to express the average-reward MDP in the form of the Bellman equation, the average adjusted sum of utility (i.e., bias) following policy π is introduced as follows:
with which the average-reward MDP can be expressed by the state-value function 1 :
With a variety of on-line learning methods that estimate the optimal Q-value or the bias value, a broad spectrum of valueiteration-based learning algorithms have been proposed [8] , [18] . Among them, the most widely used model-free learning algorithm is Q-learning [16] , which estimates the state-action value in (4) of a discounted MDP based on the time difference of the estimated values for the state-action value function: Q t+1 (s t , a t ) ← Q t (s t , a t )+α t r t (s t , a t ) +β max
where α t ∈ (0, 1] is the learning rate and specifies the step that the current state-action value is adjusted toward the TD sample r(s t , a t )+β max a ′ Q k (s t+1 , a ′ ). Q-learning in (7) has been proved to be able to converge to the true optimal value of the state-action value function with a stationary deterministic policy, given that
t < ∞ and all actions in all states are visited with a non-zero probability [16] . The model-free property of Q-learning is reflected in the iterative approximation procedure for the Q-values, which does not require knowing the transition map Pr(s ′ |s, a) of the MDP.
The counterpart to Q-learning in the average-reward MDP is known as R-learning [18] . In addition to learning the stateaction value of the bias (5), R-learning also needs to learn the estimate of the average reward h π . Therefore, R-learning is performed by a two-time scale learning process:
In contrast to the value-iteration-based learning algorithms (7), (8) and (9), the decision-learning methods based on the Learning Automata (LA) allow an agent to directly learn the stationary randomized policy. Instead of updating the action according to the myopic optimal Q-value in discountedreward MDP and bias-value in average-reward MDP, the LA directly updates the probabilities of actions based on the utility feedback [17] . Let the action probability vector at time instance t be π π π(t) = (π 1 (t), . . . , π |A| (t)), where |A| is the size of the action set. Then an LA-based algorithm should be able to achieve the following goal [17] π π π * = max
wherer is the value of environmental response, and is usually generated based on the instantaneous reward r t as a normalized value (i.e.,r ∈ {0, 1}). The general updating rule for LA 1 Due to the space limit, the conditions for the existence of a value function in the form of (6) is not presented here. The readers are referred to [18] for the details.
can be expressed as follows [19] :
where f and g are the penalty and reward functions, respectively. Specifically, different forms of f and g leads to different learning schemes. Among them, it has been proved that the linear-reward-inaction (i.e., L R−I ) algorithm is guaranteed to achieve the ǫ-optimal policies [20] . In [18] , the automatonupdating procedure based on L R−I is adopted to learn the optimal policy in the ergodic MDPs with average-reward objectives 2 . In other works such as [21] , the optimal policy of the discounted-reward MDP is learned by adopting the L R−I algorithm for policy updating and the standard Q-learning algorithm in (7) for Q-value estimation at the same time.
Although the two learning mechanism groups, namely, value-iteration-based learning (e.g., TD-based learning such as Q-learning and R-learning) and LA-based learning appear distinct from each other, both of them can be considered as special cases in the framework of Actor-Critic (AC) learning [22] . In the context of AC learning, the concepts of value function and policy are also known as "critic" and "actor", respectively. Since Q-learning and R-learning only learn a state-action value function and no explicit function for the policy, they are also known as the critic-only algorithms. On the contrary, without using any form of a stored value function, LA can be considered an actor-only algorithm. Extending from these two special cases, a generalized AC-based mechanism keeps track of both the state-value function and the policy evolution at the same time. Specifically, if the state-action value of the MDP is learned following the TD-based methods and in the meanwhile the learning agent's policy is updated following the LA-based methods, the AC-learning mechanism is also known as Actor-Critic LA (ACLA) [23] . A typical rule for jointly updating the state-value and policy in ACLA can be expressed as follows [23] :
(13) In (12) and (13), δ t is the adjustment toward the TD sample and for the discounted-reward MDP we have δ t = r(s t , a t )+ β max a ′ Q k (s t+1 , a ′ )−Q t (s t , a t ). Here, it is worth noting that for both critic updating and actor updating, the learning mechanisms are not limited to the aforementioned two categories of algorithms. For example, an on-policy learning algorithm, State-Action-Reward-State-Action (SARSA) 3 , can be used to replace the Q-learning-based critic-updating mechanism, and policy gradient is also widely used for actor updating to replace the LA-like actor-updating mechanism [22] . A schematic overview of the generalized AC algorithm is presented in Figure 4 .
B. Strategy Learning in the Loosely Coupled Multi-Agent System
A stochastic Multi-Agent System (MAS) can be defined by extending the 4-tuple Single-Agent MDP (SAMDP) (Definition 1) into a 5-tuple Multi-Agent MDP (MAMDP): N , S, A, {r n } n∈N , Pr(s ′ |s, a) , in which N is the set of the decision-making agents, S = ×S n is the Cartesian product of local state spaces and A = ×A n is the Cartesian product of local action spaces. When considering the learning mechanism in an MAS, it is natural to simply adopt the standard SASlearning algorithms by assuming that each agent is an independent learner with the local utility function r n . In doing so, the activities of the other agents are treated as part of an stationary environment and the learning agents update their policy without regard to interactions with the other agents. This approach enjoys popularity especially within the studies in the cooperative decision-making domain [25] , [26] . Its typical applications can be found in modeling the hunter-prey systems [27] and team coordination [28] , just to mention a few. However, it is important to note that multi-agent learning based on SAS learning mechanisms requires the joint learning process to be decomposed into local ones, so individual-agent behaviors are relatively disjoint. Otherwise, with concurrent learning, all the individual agents need to adapt their policies in the dynamic context of the other learners, in which case the basic assumption of stationary environment for the singleagent scenarios will no longer hold.
Although convergence of SAS-based learning is not guaranteed in most of the practical MAS scenarios, attempts of generalizing the convergence condition for the SAS-based learning mechanism can still be found in the literature. One important property of the SAS-based learning mechanism, although being limited in the practical value for complicated scenarios, is given in the following theorem [29] : 3 About the difference between Q-learning and SARSA, the readers are referred to [24] for more details 
Theorem 1 indicates that as long as all the individual agents abide by the Q-learning rules with decreasing actionexploration probability, the likelihood of remaining in a nonequilibrium vanishes over time. However, it is worth to point out that in practical scenarios, it usually takes a significant amount of time for merely switching between one pair of actions. As a results, most of the practical SAS-based learning mechanisms are limited in the special scenarios such as the common-payoff MASs. In the framework of the independent learning algorithm using standard Q-learning [29] , other SASbased learning algorithms for MAS usually try to eliminate the uncertainty caused by the actions of the other agents while still retaining the distributivity of the decision-making process. One typical example can be found in [30] , which projects the global Q-table of a deterministic MAMDP (namely, the state transition is deterministic in the MDP) using centralized Q-learning with joint action a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), Q(s, a), to the local Qtable of agent i with only local action information a i , Q(s, a i ). Following the standard Q-learning rule, the projection-based independent learning adopts an optimistic assumption that all the other agents will act optimally. However, the learning result of such a distributed algorithm is greedy with respect to the centralized Q-table with the joint action. Additionally, its convergence when extended to the scenarios of stochastic MAMDPs is not guaranteed since it cannot discern the influence of the behaviors of the other agents from that of the state dynamics. It is important to note that without explicit coordination, which is at the cost of losing the distributiveness of the decision-making process, all the independent-learningbased algorithms will suffer for the same reason in the tightly coupled, MAS-based scenarios.
Despite all the limits of independent learning, one important benefit of adopting the disjoint learning processes in the MAS is that it creates the opportunities of experience sharing among individual agents. In [27] , [31] , the "implicit imitation" mechanism by the observer agents is proposed to incorporate the experience of the expert agents in the MAS. Under the MDP framework, it is assumed that the learning agents are analogous to each other in terms of state space, state transition and action set [31] . Then experience transferring can be implemented by modifying the estimated state-action value of the observer agent based on the expertise evaluation of the mentor agents and the weighted combination of their respective Q-values [27] . When experience transferring is considered beyond the framework of model-free learning and the model-based policy-learning mechanism is adopted, the observer agent can also implement the experience learning by maintaining the estimation of the mentor's transition map from observation, and incorporating it into its own value-iteration process [31] .
C. Multi-Agent Strategy Learning in the Context of Games
In most of the practical scenarios, the dynamics of the multiagent MDP (e.g., the transition probabilities and the local payoff) is determined by the joint policy of all the agents. To facilitate distributed policy learning, the multi-agent MDP is usually viewed as a Stochastic Game (SG). Mathematically, an SG shares exactly the same 5-tuple structure as a multi-agent MDP, N , S, A, {r n } n∈N , Pr(s ′ |s, a) , but the goal of each agent in the SG is to maximize its individual payoff instead [32] . Based on the definition of SGs, a repeated game can be obtained as a 3-tuple, N , A = ×A n , {r n } n∈N , by fixing the environment state as invariant while maintaining the objective of each player as maximizing its individual discounted/average payoff over the infinite time horizon. In the repeated game, the system dynamics is reduced to only the mapping between the action and the payoff: r n : A → R. Further, when the repeated game is played only once, it is reduced to a static game. In return, any single shot of an SG or a repeated game is a static game and is known as a single stage or one-shot game of the original game [33] .
One important reason for adopting the game-theory-based models lies in the requirements that decisions are to be made in a distributed manner with the limited ability of both information acquisition and action coordination. This may be either due to the overwhelming dimension of the state-action space as the number of agents grows, or due to the overhead for information exchange among agents. In the game-based decision-making model, the individual-rationality property of the agents leads to the concept of the best response. In an SG, the best response of agent n is defined as the policy {π n = Pr(s, a n ) : s ∈ S} such that the long-term payoff under local policy π n is not worse than that under any other local policies: V n (π n , π −n ) ≥ V n (π ′ n , π −n ), given the joint adversary policy π −n . Here, π −n is the joint strategy of the adversary agents except agent n and V n can be either the discounted long-term payoff or the average long-term payoff. If ∀n ∈ N , the policy is a best response to the joint strategy of the other agents, we say that the policy profile (π 1 , . . . , π |N | ) is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) [32] . In the context of games, the goal of policy learning now becomes finding the policy updating rules for reaching a specific equilibrium. Apart from the most commonly used solution concept of NEs, a policy learning mechanism may resort to other types of equilibria for the convenience such as ensuring convergence or improving performance. In order to facilitate our discussion on different learning algorithms, we provide the formal definition of several equilibria in discounted-reward SG G = N , S, A, {r n } n∈N , Pr(s ′ |s, a) as follows:
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium (NE)). In a game G, an NE point is a tuple of strategies (π * 1 , . . . , π * |N | ) such that ∀s ∈ S, ∀n ∈ N and ∀π n ∈ Π n , V β,n (s, π Definition 3 (Correlated Equilibrium (CE)). In a game G, a CE point is a joint strategies π * = (π * n , π * −n ) such that ∀n ∈ N , ∀s ∈ S and ∀a n , a
β,i (s, a n , a −n ) is given by (4) with a slight abuse of notation and π * (s, a n , a −n ) = π * (s, a −n |a n )π * (s, a n ). 
Based on Definitions 2-4, the conditions of equilibria for repeated/static games can be obtained in a similar way. From the perspective of strategy derivation, a CE can be considered a generalized form of an NE since it does not require the individual player's strategy to be independent with each other. Although the adoption of a CE is recognized as being able to provide a better performance of an NE, such a performance improvement is usually at the cost of introducing an arbitrator or coordinator into the game [32] . From the perspective of convergence reaching, an ǫ-equilibrium can be considered a form of both NE and CE with relaxed condition. For learning algorithm design in repeated games, the introduction of ǫ-equilibrium helps develop the learning mechanisms that guarantee the convergence to near-equilibrium with a limit-inferior bound. However, it is worth noting that for a general SG, the existence of a stationary ǫ-equilibrium is not guaranteed beyond the case of two-player SGs [34] .
According to the Folk theorem [35] , for every infinitehorizon, n-player, discounted repeated/stochastic game with a finite number of actions, the existence of a stationary policy π π π * as a subgame-perfect NE [32] is guaranteed. By proving the existence of a subgame-perfect NE, the Folk theorem implies that when compared with the static oneshot game, policy learning may be able to obtain a better payoff with the new NE in the repeated games. Such a benefit is also considered a major motivation for the engineers to adopt the game-based learning algorithms in the domain of distributed decision-making. However, the implementations of the learning algorithms heavily rely on the game structures and the forms of the equilibria, and may differ significantly. Within the past two decades, numerous methods have been proposed for strategy learning in games. In order to facilitate our survey on their applications in cognitive heterogeneous networks, we categorize the model-free learning algorithms along the following dimensions 5 : 1) Value-iteration vs. policy iteration: in SGs, most of the learning algorithms based on the state-action value estimation fall into the category of value-iteration based algorithms. These algorithms include minimax Q-learning [36] , NSCP-learning [37] Nash Q-learning [38] , Nash Rlearning [39] , CE-Q learning [40] , etc. In contrary to value-iteration-based learning, the policy-iteration-based learning algorithms directly update the action-probability vectors of each agent, using either the observation of the adversary agents' action pattern or the payoff received from interaction with the environment. These algorithms include standard Fictitious Play (FP) [41] , asynchronous best response [42] , LA-based learning algorithms (e.g., L R−I learning [20] and Bush-Mosteller learning [43] ), gradient-play-based better reply [44] , no-regret learning [45] , etc. In the cases when both the strategy and the local expected payoff are to be learned, the AC-like, multiple-timescale learning algorithms [46] provide an efficient strategy-learning approach (e.g., stochastic FP [41] ) for the agents. Further, when the joint action or the payoff of the adversary agents is not directly observable, conjecture-variation-based learning [47] works as an alternative way of the aforementioned learning algorithms. 2) NE vs. other equilibria: most of the learning algorithms in 1) such as [20] , [36] - [39] , [42] - [44] aim at finding the NE of the repeated games/SGs. By contrast, the goal of CE-Q learning [40] and some no-regret learning algorithms [45] is to learn the CE in the SG and the repeated game, respectively. By relaxing the condition of an NE from the profile of real actions to the profile of agent beliefs, conjecture-variation-based learning [47] is able to converge to the conjecture equilibrium [48] . In most practical scenarios based on the framework of general repeated games, FP and stochastic FP only guarantee that the ǫ-equilibrium (sometimes also known as the Logit equilibrium when the Logit function 6 is used for strategy updating) can be reached [41] . 3) Noncooperative games, cooperative games and team games: technically, these three major categories cover most of the game-based models in the applications of distributed control. Provided that the noncooperative 5 All the game-based learning methods to be discussed in the following sections originate from these algorithms, and in Section III more details will be provided for each of them. 6 About the definition of a Logit function, please refer to Section III-D3. games satisfy certain properties (e.g., being supermodular/submodular [49] , having a unique NE, etc.), all of the aforementioned learning algorithms in 1) and 2) may ensure to reach one of the equilibria in the game. For cooperative games, which are usually featured by the process of bargaining or coalition formation among agents, the Nash bargaining solution can be learned through FP [50] . A team game is defined as the game in which the agents share the common payoff function, thus considered as a fully cooperative case of the general SG-based games. Since every team game can be modeled as a potential game [32] , it is possible to apply bestresponse-based learning [51] , stochastic FP [49] or noregret learning [52] to learn the NE of a repeated team game. In the case of team SGs, each agent can also be associated with one single learning automaton at one game state, then by applying L R−I learning a purestrategy NE is guaranteed to be reached [53] .
D. A Quick Summary of Model-Free Learning Algorithms
Before proceeding to the next section, we provide a quick summary of the briefly-introduced learning mechanisms in Figure 5 . In Figure 5 , the learning mechanisms are categorized according to the approach of experience updating (i.e., value iteration or policy iteration) that they apply. In Table II , we further summarize the characteristics of these learning mechanisms in terms of stability property and the system models (SAS, MAS and games) that they are built upon. Figure 5 and Table II together provide a quick sketch of the algorithms that are to be surveyed with respect to their applications in cognitive wireless networks. More details of the characteristics of each learning mechanism will be provided in the following sections.
III. APPLICATIONS OF MODEL-FREE STRATEGY LEARNING IN COGNITIVE WIRELESS NETWORKS
Owning to the properties of adaptiveness and selforganization, a model-free learner in cognitive wireless networks benefits from reducing the level of required a priori knowledge about the network model as well as the overhead due to explicit information exchange. It is also possible for decision-making entities to adapt quickly to the changes of the network environment. As a result, model-free learning is particularly suitable for resource management and scheduling problems that demand the network devices' self-exploration and self-organization. This section provides a comprehensive survey on the applications of model-free learning in the cognitive wireless networks (following the broad-sense definition of CRNs), and will cover a wide spectrum of problems across different layers of the network-protocol stacks. In a nutshell, the survey on the applications of model-free learning algorithms is organized based on the categorization that is provided in Section II. According to the types of decision-making models that are used for mathematically describing different wireless networking problems, the learning mechanisms is categorized into three major classes based on single-agent systems, loosely coupled multi-agent systems and game-based multi-agent systems, respectively. In addition, the survey on game-based learning is further categorized into repeated-gamebased learning and SG-based learning. Also, a comprehensive survey on experience sharing for learning in the context of loosely coupled multi-agent systems is provided.
A. Applications of Learning in Single-Agent Systems
The early attempts in applying learning algorithms to wireless networking problems appeared even before the concept of cognitive radios was proposed. Generally, the a-priori knowledge of the environment evolution dynamics (e.g., the transition probabilities of the MDPs) is not required by the MDPbased, value-iteration learning schemes. Thus, the schemes are widely applied to the problems in the time-varying dynamics of the wireless environment that cannot be perfectly sensed. These problems include dynamic packet routing [54] , Dynamic Channel Assignment (DCA) [55] , [56] and joint radio resource management for multi-rate transmission control in WCDMA networks [57] , etc. The strategy-learning schemes in these studies are featured by a single/centralized agent, and are usually based on the standard Q-learning algorithm (see (7)). In early studies, the learning schemes are built upon the simplified system models. Thus, the issues such as the convergence conditions of the learning schemes are still not the focus of the discussion. As a result, the existence of Markovian property is simply assumed in most of these works [55] - [57] . Also, in order to reduce the complexity of the system model, the original MDPs modeling the network dynamics are usually transformed into new MDPs with reduced state-action space using state abstraction [58] or Q-table projection. However, the equivalence between the original MDPs and the re-transformed MDPs is generally not guaranteed (see the example of [57] ). In most of these works (e.g., [54] , [55] ), the learning rules are designed in a heuristic manner. Sometimes the standard Q-learning schemes are modified by introducing the neural networks in order to represent the table of the state-action values and approximate the Q-value-updating function [54] , [56] , [57] . With these simplifications, the convergence to an optimal strategy of the learning schemes in these studies is also not guaranteed.
Among different approaches for simplifying the MDP-based model of the network-control process, state abstraction [58] turns out to be a necessary way of trading off optimality for the efficiency of the single-agent-based learning mechanisms. The necessity of state-action-space reduction lies in the need for computational tractability of the learning schemes in the case of state-action-space explosion. This is especially necessary when a central learning agent is learning the strategy from a large set of candidate actions in a system with a huge number of states. In the context of networking problems, state abstraction maps the original MDP-based network-control model into a new MDP with a smaller state-action set. Mathematically, state abstraction in MDPs can be defined as follows: 
and
However, a state-abstraction method generally requires that the state transition in the new MDP with reduced complexity to be well-defined. Namely, the linear-combination-based mapping in (15) and (16) needs to be established and the condition s ′ Pr(s ′ |s, a) = 1 needs to be satisfied. Since with model-free learning, the transition models are generally not known, it will be practically impossible to obtain an accurate model of the reduced MDP. In order to address such an issue, approximate abstraction is proposed in [59] , [60] . In [59] , [60] , an on-policy reinforcement learning method, SARSA, is applied to the DCA problem in a multi-cell, multichannel network with the consideration of handoffs. In the considered cellular network, N cells provide M channels to mobile stations, thus forming an N ×(M +1) ×M state-action set. The arbitrary state-aggregation method proposed in [59] , [60] aggregates the rarely encountered states by reducing the channel state space size to a fraction of the total number of the channels. The state variable representing the number of currently allocated channels is also excluded, which leads to a 98% reduction from the original state-action space. A more complicated state-action-space abstraction method can be found in [57] . It adopts the feature extraction method and maps the original state vector based on four dimensions, namely, the mean and variance of the interference from the existing connections, the transmission type and the required transmission rate, into a vector of the resultant interference profile. The feature extraction method is further adopted in stochastic-game-based modeling for strategy learning in CRNs [61] , [62] . In particular, the individual CRs use their local tax announced by the central spectrum moderator to classify the local states that the adversary CRs are in. In these works, the feature extraction method does not only achieve the goal of state abstraction, but also help avoid the explicit information exchange between individual CRs.
With the development of MDP-based modeling in different protocol layers of the wireless networks (see examples in MAC layer [63] , link layer [64] and application layer [65] ), the SAS-based learning mechanisms in the cognitive wireless networks also gain more capabilities in addressing the radio resource management problems in depth. In [66] , the problem of real-time video transmission over a single-hop, slow-varying flat fading channel is formulated as a systematic layered MDP (see Figure 6 and Figure 7 for a schematic view of the system and the corresponding layered MDP model). With the proposed problem formulation, the discrete system state is composed of three components, i.e., the SNR as the channel state in the PHY layer, the transmission opportunity as the state of the MAC layer and the amount of both the incoming traffic and the buffered packets as the state of the application layer (see Figure 7 ). The evolution of the joint state (s AP P , s P HY ) is modeled as a Markov chain controlled by the joint action (a AP P , Z MAC , a P HY ) (see Figure 7 ). The joint action is determined by the power allocation, the channel resource payment made to the spectrum moderator and the packet scheduling algorithm. The cross-layer management of packet transmission is formulated as a layered MDP. This is because for the Bellman optimality equation of the state value, the Dynamic Programming (DP) based expression can be decomposed into a two-loop DP-based optimization. In the two-loop optimization, it is assumed that both layers have access to the global state in each time slot. The inner loop (i.e., the application-layer optimization) only needs to know the joint MAC-application action and the reported state value of the PHY layer for policy updating, while the outer loop (i.e., the PHY-layer optimization) only needs to know the PHY-layer action information and the reported state value from the application layer for policy updating. The layered Q-learning [67] can be applied to learn the optimal strategy for transmission, with the standard Q-value updating rule in (7) modified in each layer by incorporating the estimated Qvalue from the other layer.
Apart from lacking of the a-priori knowledge about the statistics of the underlying Markov process, the decisionmaking entity in the network may frequently face the constraints on the available resources. To tackle these constrained radio resource allocation/scheduling problems, the unconstrained MDP models are extended to the Constrained MDPs (CMDPs), based on which, modified reinforcement learning algorithms are also proposed [68] - [73] . Mathematically, the CMDP is defined by expanding the 4-tuple MDP model (Definition 1) to be a 5-tuple, S, A, r, c, Pr(s ′ |s, a) , with the additional cost/constraint element c [74] . Taking the averagereward CMDP as an example, a generic CMDP optimization problem can be stated as follows: 
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then there exists an optimal Lagrange multiplier λ * such that the optimal solution of the CMDP is equivalent to the optimal solution of the unconstrained MDP, S, A, g = r − λ * c, Pr(s ′ |s, a) .
According to Theorem 2, the non-structured learning schemes for the unconstrained MDP based on the Lagrangian dual function can be developed for solving the resource management/scheduling problems in the form of both Rlearning [69] , [71] , [73] and Q-learning [68] , [72] , [75] , depending on the form of the reward/cost of the CMDP. Apart from the primal-dual equivalence based solution, it is also possible to develop constrained learning algorithms by exploiting the structure of the specific problems. The special structure is featured by the convexity of the objective and constraint functions in the original CMDP, or the modularity of the objective or the constraint functions [72] , [76] . When certain structure property of the network control problems is satisfied (specifically, when both the instantaneous payoff and the constraint cost are multi-modular), the constrained structured-learning algorithm can be applied in the form of primal projection or submodular parameterization [76] .
In addition to not knowing the environment evolution dynamics and being limited by the resource constraints, the learning agents in a wireless network may also lack of the ability of complete state-information acquisition. This can be a common issue in scenarios such as DSA networks, in which the secondary devices lack of the capability of performing fullspectrum sensing due to a limit on the number of antennas [77] . The common approach to handle such a problem is to model the radio resource management problem as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). Extending from Definition 1, an unconstrained POMDP can be defined as a 6-tuple, S, Ω, A, r, Pr(s ′ |s, a), Pr(ω|s, a) , in which Ω is the set of observations, and Pr(ω|s, a) denotes the mapping probability between the system states and the observations. Instead of directly observing the state information of s, the learning agent can only obtain the network observation ω. In the POMDPs, the random process associated with the observation is no longer a Markov process. A standard modelbased solution to the POMDP is to convert the recorded state observations into belief states, and obtain a new unconstrained MDP with a continuous state space of the belief states. However, when the state-transition and the state-observation mapping is unknown, the TD-based learning schemes cannot be directly used for learning the optimal strategies of the POMDPs. Instead, other learning algorithms such as actorcritic learning [78] and policy-gradient-based learning [79] are applied. In [80] , a delay-constrained least-cost routing problem in MANETs is modeled as a POMDP, the belief state of which captures the link-delay uncertainty due to the imprecise link A heterogeneous network is featured by the hierarchy in the network structure, which is comprised by the high-power, highcapacity, wide-range macrocells and the low-power, low-capcity, small-range femtocells/picocells [86] .
state information. The belief-policy mapping is considered as a parametric function, the policy parameter of which is learned through a standard actor-critic learning method. In [81] , to solve the DSA problem in a CRN, the channel access process of the Secondary Users (SUs) is first modeled as a constrained POMDP. In the constrained POMDP, a reward function is used to collect the instantaneous reward of the SUs, while a cost function reflects the instantaneous cost of the Primary Users (PUs) due to the channel interference from the SUs. The partial observation in the problem comes from the imperfect spectrum sensing of the SUs over the primary channel state. After converting the original constrained POMDP into an unconstrained POMDP with the help of the Lagrange multiplier, the learning algorithm based on policy gradient [79] is applied for finding a local optimal policy. To summarize this subsection, we categorize in Table III the aforementioned works (and some more) on SAS learning according to the networking applications that they focus on. As shown by Table III, the SAS-based learning algorithms are powerful in addressing a number of radio resource allocation problems, as long as they can be formulated as a single-linkcentric one. However, it is worth noticing that although the theoretical support for the convergence of the SAS-learning schemes has been well studied, such an issue still needs to be addressed under practical circumstances.
B. Applications of Distributed Learning in the Context of Loosely Coupled Multi-Agent Systems
The multi-agent learning scheme naturally leads to the framework of distributed decision making, thus the possibility of self-organization without a dedicated central coordinator. Therefore, it is considered especially appropriate for the network management problems in the CRNs, device-to-device (D2D) networks, heteronomous networks (HETNETs) and adhoc networks, which consist of multiple independent decision- [55], [56] , [59] , [60] , [82] Q-learning [55] , [56] , [82] , SARSA [59] , [60] Neural Network [56] , State abstraction [59] , [60] [69], [71] , [81] , [84] Actor-critic learning [84] , R-learning [69] , [71] , policy gradient [81] N/A [69] , [81] , [84] , Arbitrary state reduction [71] Deterministic optimal policy [69] , N/A [71] , [84] , Local optimum policy [81] Heterogeneous networks making entities. Although in many scenarios it is possible to formulate the network control problem as a loosely coupled multi-agent system and apply the distributed learning schemes as we have introduced in Section II-B, it is necessary to emphasize that for most cases it is difficult to draw a straight line between a non-game-based, multi-agent decision learning scheme and an SG-based learning scheme. The reason for this lies in the inherited nature of strategy coupling in most of the practical networking problem setups. One typical example is illustrated by [87] , [88] , which consider that L macrocells and N femtocells/picocells operate over the same frequency band (see Figure 8) . In order to develop a self-organized power allocation scheme for the downlink transmission in the heterogeneous network, the Shannon capacity of a link is considered as the individual utility of a cell, which is a function of the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio (SINR) of the transmitting link in that cell. Take the femtocells/picocells as an example, when both the intra-cell interference and the cross-tier interference are considered, for femotocell/picocell link i the SINR at the receiver is determined as follows:
in which p i,F r is the transmit power of femto/pico Base Station (BS) i over the resource block r, h F F ii,r is the link gain between the femto/pico BS and its user, h MF ji,r is the link gain between macro BS j and the femto/pico user, h F F ki,r is the link gain from another femto/pico BS k to the user of femto/pico BS i, and σ 2 is the noise power. Apparently, the capacity of femto/pico link i is determined not only by the transmit power of femto/pico BS i, p h MF ji,r . Therefore, the private utility of femto/pico link i is also a function of the strategy of the other femto/pico BS k (k = 1, . . . , n, k = i) and all the macro BSs j (j = 1, . . . , L). The goal of the local cells for maximizing the private utilities conflicts with each other, and it is difficult to decompose the strategy coupling between the cells. As a result, many works formulate the same problem as a noncooperative repeated game [89] , [90] . However, it is still possible to tackle such a power control problem by treating the strategies of the other BSs as part of the environment dynamics. For example, in [87] the system state from the perspective of a femto/pico link is designed as a binary one:
which is based on hard thresholding (compared with the permitted SINR given as γ Th ) of the macrocell user with the interference from the femto/pico links. The similar network-state formulation can be found in the other works such as [88] . By adopting a standard Q-learning scheme based on the assumption of independent state-value evolution, it is assumed in [87] , [88] that the dynamics of the aggregated interference to the macrocell user is a stationary Markov process. Consequently all the strategies of the other femto/pico users are treated as stationary ones hence part of the wireless environment.
In most of the cases, such a formulation/solution with the distributed MDPs and independent Q-learning algorithm may not guarantee the convergence to any equilibrium. However, empirical studies show that when using the distributed Qlearning scheme, convergence can still be achieved given a sufficiently large number of iterations [87] , [91] , [92] , and the distributed Q-learning algorithm is also able to achieve a better PU1 CR1 CR2 PU2 Fig. 9 . Illustration of the interference map for the two-SU-two-PU DSA network (reproduced from [98] ).
performance compared with the non-adaptive algorithms [88] , [91] , [92] . Generally, for the network management problems with strategy coupling, directly adopting the distributed learning schemes in the loosely coupled MAS (e.g., multi-agent learning in the form of distributed, independent Q-learning) can be considered as an approach that trades off the certainty of algorithm convergence for the simplicity of system analysis and learning-rule design. Except for heterogeneous networks, applications that follow such a design pattern can be found in the problem formulation such as distributed DSA with the SU collisions [93] - [95] , power allocation in the overlay, cognitive wireless mesh network [96] and dynamic spectrum management in 4G cellular networks [97] . Although with so many studies that adopt such a design pattern for the learning schemes, it is never too cautious to reiterate that overlooking strategy coupling may result in undermining the performance of each learning agent. In [98] , a problem of DSA management with 2 SUs over 2 primary channels (see Figure  9 ) is used to exemplify how the lack of coordination between individual agents may impact the agent performance. In [98] , the availability of a primary channel is modeled as a two-state discrete Markov chain. The SUs try to access the idle primary channel while avoiding the collision with the other SU. The adaptation of the channel-access strategies is formulated as a POMDP, in which the observation of an SU includes 3 states: busy, collision and success. Based on the assumption that the presence of the other SU can be ignored, a modelbased single-user approach for strategy updating is proposed. When compared with the cooperative approach, which allows the SUs to exchange their belief state vectors of the POMDP, the performance of the single-user-based approach is shown to be significantly inferior. Moreover, the simulation results in [98] show that the performance of the single-agent-based approach is even worse than that of the deterministic channelassignment scheme, which indicates that in the situation of strategy coupling, allowing some degree of cooperation will be essential.
In order to balance between the simplicity of the learning mechanism (namely, the distributiveness of strategy learning) and the optimality of the learning algorithm, careful modeling is needed with respect to different network scenarios. In [99] , a set of decision-learning mechanisms based on distributed Q-learning is adopted for a scalable DSA mechanism in an overlay CRN. The goal of the learning mechanism design is to obtain the near-optimal strategies without the explicit coordination among the SUs. It is shown in [99] that by properly designing the private objective functions of the individual SUs, the needs of both agent coordination and distributed decision-learning can be fulfilled. The SUs are assumed to share the temporarily free band roughly equally. It means that the reward of an individual SU with DSA (denoted by r i (t)) is approximately equal to the average of the social reward of all the SUs that attempt to use the same primary band (denoted by G(t)): (20) in which s i (t) is the set of SUs that interfere with SU i over the same band at time t. The PU activity is also modeled as a two-state Markov chain. In [99] , two guidelines are proposed for designing the private objective function of each SU: 1) alignedness, which reflects agent coordination and the full alignedness requires the SUs not working against each other when maximizing their own private objectives; 2) sensitivity, which reflects the efficiency of the individual learning processes and requires the SUs to be able to discern the impact of their own action changes so as to learn about the better local strategies fast enough. In [99] , the indices of "factoredness" and "learnability" are introduced to measure alignedness and sensitivity of the private objective function, respectively. Denoting the private objective function as g i and the joint deterministic strategy by the SUs over the same band as π π π = (π i , π −i ), the degree of factoredness and learnability can be expressed as in (21) and (22) , respectively:
where, I[x] is the indicator function, I[x] = 1 if x > 0 and I[x] = 0 otherwise, and F gi F gi (0 ≤ F gi ≤ 1) measures the consistence between the local objective and the social payoff. The higher the degree of (i.e., the value of F gi ) is, the more likely a change of the local action by SU i will have the same impact on both its private reward and the global reward. L i,gi measures the sensitivity of local reward to the local action changes. According to (22) , the higher the sensitivity (i.e., the learnability), the more the dependence of g i (π π π) on the local actions of SU i. By employing the property (20) , namely, the private reward r i (t) being proportional to the global reward G(t), it is shown in [99] that a good objective function can be obtained by removing from G(t) the effects of all SUs other than SU i. A general form of such a local objective function can be expressed as follows:
Since r i (t) is a function of both G(t) and the cardinality of the interfering-SU set s i (t), all that SU i needs to obtain the value of D i is to estimate |s i (t)| given the locally-observed information that SU i observes locally. It is shown that with the proposed objective function (23), the distributed learning scheme achieves better spectrum efficiency than those learning with both private reward and global reward. From the gametheory perspective, spectrum access with the individual reward as in (20) can be interpreted as a cardinal potential game [32] , in which (23) is in the exact form of a potential function. In this sense, the design of the objective function in [99] can be considered as a special case of global-reward-based learning, and may not be easily extended to a general radio resource management problem such as [87] , [88] . Different approaches to the utility/learning-scheme design will still be needed for other networking applications. Instead of designing a different objective function, the learning scheme itself can also be tailored to meet the requirement of radio resource management. One example of learning scheme design in the strategy-coupling scenario is provided by [100] , which studies an Aloha-like spectrum access scheme without any negotiation in a multiuser, multichannel CRN ( Figure 10 ). In [100] , N primary channels are modeled as N independent, binary-state Markov chains, while the SUs are assumed to conduct no mutual communication and need to learn the collision-avoidance strategies online. Instead of adopting the standard state-value evolution model in (4) and the TD-based strategy-learning mechanism in (7), the expected one-time reward is adopted as (24):
and a learning mechanism without considering the future reward is designed as (25): (24) and (25), a i (t) = j represents the action of SU i to select channel j for transmission, s is the vector of the channel states, α ij (t) is the learning step, r i (t) is the instantaneous reward of SU i and I(·) is the indicator function. Although (25) appears in a similar form to distributed Qlearning, it is derived based on the analysis of the channel contention as an SG. It is shown in [100] that with the Boltzmann distribution-based exploration, the learning scheme in (25) is equivalent to the Robbins-Monro iteration [101] and converges asymptotically to a stationary point (i.e., an NE) with probability 1.
Generally, the aforementioned multi-agent learning schemes fall into two categories, namely, distributed learning based on the assumption of purely independent state-value evolution (e.g., [87] , [88] , [91] - [97] ) and distributed learning based on the structural property of the specific resource management problems (e.g., [99] , [100] ). Although both of them do not require explicit information exchange among network devices, sometimes introducing a certain level of information exchange (at the cost of more overhead) will help improve the network performance. In the literature, the learning schemes with explicit information exchange is usually referred to as learning based on Distributed Value Function (DVF). With DVF, local devices are required to share their state-value/reward functions with the neighbors. Instead of learning the Q-value based on the private reward or local state values, individual decision making aims at the maximization of both the local and the neighbors' weighted sum of rewards/state-values. By modifying (7), a typical strategy learning with DVF can be expressed as
in which N (i) is the set of device i's neighbors (including i) and w i (j) is the weight that determinines the constribution of device j's state-value to device i's estimation of V i . For wireless networks, the applications of the DVF-based learning mechanism can be found in [102] - [104] . In [102] , DVF-based learning is used in an ad-hoc sensor network to coordinate the sensing and hibernation operation as the state of the grid-point coverage changes. To encourage the sensor node with a larger coverage area to do the sensing operation, the private reward is designed as a function of the number of the covered grid points. It is shown that DVF-based learning outperforms the independent learner-based learning algorithm, especially under the condition of high sensor node densities. In [103] , a learning algorithm based on the exchange of both the instantaneous reward and the estimated local state-value is proposed for the joint control of power and relay selection in a distributed cooperative network. The proposed learning scheme is featured by weighting over both the instantaneous reward and the estimated local state-value that are shared by the neighbor nodes, and thus is called learning with Distributed Reward and Value (DRV) function. By extending (26) , the rule of learning with DRV can be expressed as follows:
in which w ′ i (j) and w i (j) are the weight given to the neighbors' instantaneous reward and estimated state value, respectively. With the learning scheme in (27) , each node in the network maintains a vector of both the channel/buffer state of its direct link and the channel/buffer state of its cooperative link. It is shown in [103] that learning based on sharing both the instantaneous rewards and the local state values can achieve a better power efficiency than using only the reward or the state value information. In [104] , the DVFbased learning scheme is adopted in a real-time multimedia cellular network to adapt the power allocation of interfering Power allocation and experience sharing [104] Coordinated decisionmaking
links. In addition to coordinating the individual links, the Qvalue updating mechanism (26) is also used to improve the convergence of the newly adopted links in the network.
In Table IV , we categorize the works discussed in this subsection according to their respective applications. For applications of multi-agent independent-learning schemes in wireless networks, convergence of learning also remains an open issue in most of the existing studies. Comparied with the SAS-based learning algorithms, adopting independent learning schemes requires more attention for any specific networking optimization problem.
C. Experience Sharing Based on Distributed Learning
We call a distributed learning process homogeneous when the distributed learning agents apply the same learning method with an evolution determined by exactly the same stochastic process. In the framework of homogeneous learning processes, it is possible for individual agents to share their private experience (strategies, estimated Q-values, etc.) with the other agent in order to accelerate the learning process and improve the performance. Recently, the possibility of applying the teacherpupil paradigm in human cognition to solve the wireless networking problems has been discussed in a series of studies [105] - [108] . In these pioneering studies, the paradigm of "docitive network" was proposed based on the extension of distributed cognitive networks (Figure 11 ). In the framework of docitive networks, "docition" (teaching) is performed by a more experienced network agent to accelerate the learning process of the other agents. Depending on the degree of docition among the wireless devices, the teaching-learning process can be distinguished into 3 categories [105] :
• Startup docition: each wireless node learns independently.
When a new node joins the network, instead of learning from zero experience, it learns the policies from docitive nodes which have already acquired a certain level of expertise on strategy selection.
• Adaptive docition: the nodes exchange information about the performance of their learning processes. The docitive nodes share policies and the learning nodes learn from the expert neighbors which have the best performance.
• Perfect docition: each node in the network is able to observe the joint action and all individual rewards. Based on the observation, every docitive node models its interaction with the rest of the network as a complete centralized MDP separately and selects its individual actions.
The basic prerequisite for implementing docition in any networking problems is that the individual learning processes can be modeled as parallel, homogeneous MDPs, through which imitating the strategies of the docitive nodes by the learning nodes will not influence the policies of the docitive nodes. However, empirical studies have shown that relaxing such a constraint in the situation of a noncooperative game-like scenario may also help improve the performance of the learning nodes [106] , [108] , [109] . In [106] , the distributed downlink power allocation problem in an IEEE 802.22 WRAN (underlay to the TV-Broadcasting bandwidth) is studied. An aggregated interference model from the SUs to the PU is considered. The channel state experienced by the individual SUs is defined according to a hard thresholding on the aggregated interference, which is similar to (19) . Each secondary BS ignores the impact of the other BSs on the channel state and adopts a standard independent Q-learning scheme to learn its own power selection strategy. The docition process is based on exchanging the Q-tables among the neighbor secondary BSs. In this case, the learning nodes perform either the startup docition or the adaptive docition periodically by adopting the Q-tables of the expert nodes with the best performance. The simulations in [106] show that the docitive paradigm significantly speeds up the learning process with respect to the case of independent learners. A similar approach is adopted in [108] , [109] , which study the power allocation problem in self-organized heterogeneous networks with femotocells. In these studies, a cross-tier interference model is adopted in a manner similar to (18) , while strategy coupling among the femto links is also ignored by individual learners. Again, here docition is performed through exchanging the Q-tables among the neighbor nodes. In [108] , the similarity metric to measure of the correlation between the femto BS strategy and the aggregated interference to the macrocell was introduced by a user-defined gradient. The proposed similarity metric is used to measure the similarity of the policies between two neighbor nodes. With the similarity metric, the learning nodes can not only adopt the Q-tables from the neighbor nodes with the best performance, but also take into account the degree of the similarity between their own action-state correlation and their neighbors'.
While it is relatively easy to implement docition in the framework of independent Q-learning based on the model of parallel, homogeneous MDPs, it generally remains an open issue to estimate the similarity of the policies between two neighbor learners when the learning processes are heterogeneous. Especially, in the scenario of strategy coupling and interest conflict, imitating the strategies or the Q-tables of the adversary neighbor node with the best performance may result in strategy oscillation. Such a situation can be illustrated by revisiting the power allocation problem defined by (18) . In the simplified situation of mutual interference with only two femto BSs, increasing the transmit power of one BS will result in the performance deterioration for the other BS, because the interference to the other BS is also increased. Consider the case that the BS with smaller transmit power decides to adopt the strategy of its rival BS by increasing its transmit power. If independent Q-learning is used by both BSs to learn their power selection strategies, the other BS will soon discover that it will benefit from increasing its current transmit power too. This creates an "arm race" situation in which each BS begins to increase its transmit power in turn until both the BSs reach their maximum power level, which is a typical situation of the prisoner's dilemma in noncooperative games. Such an unwanted situation can be avoided if both BSs treat the power allocation process as a noncooperative game and adopt the learning methods in games such as Fictitious Play (FP) and best response without any docition procedure 7 . As a result, in works such as [111] the docitive paradigm and the game-based learning paradigm are considered two controversial frameworks for strategy learning. However, it is worth noting that with emerging techniques such as transfer learning [112] and experience-weighted attraction learning [113] , incorporating the teaching process in the game-based framework of learning is no longer impossible. For this part, we will leave discussion of more details to Section IV.
D. Applications of Learning in the Context of Repeated Games
By modeling distributed network control problems as games, it is possible to design learning schemes that theoretically guarantee the convergence of the individual strategies to a fixed point or equilibrium. In this subsection, we consider the repeated games as the special cases of SGs, and introduce the applications of learning algorithms based on repeated games and SGs separately. We will organize the learning algorithms based on the three game property dimensions discussed in Section II-C. Our major focus will be (a) the rules in each learning scheme; (b) the conditions and properties of the games with which a specific learning scheme may convergence; and (c) the degree of information exchange required by each learning scheme to achieve convergence.
1) Fictitious Play and Stochastic Fictitious Play:
The basic prerequisite of the standard FP is that the agents are willing to reveal their (discrete) action information to the others after each round of play, so they can track the frequency of action selection by the other agents [41] . With FP, agent i assesses the distribution of its opponent's actions at round t as follows:
where I(a, b) is the indicator function, with I(a, b) = 1 if a = b and I(a, b) = 0 otherwise. Agent i estimates the probability for the opponent agents to play the joint action a −i at round t as:
In this sense, FP is sometimes considered as a model-based mechanism since with (29) it tries to build the model of the opponents' joint policy from accumulated experience. However, compared with other purely model-based mechanisms (such as dynamic programming for MDPs), it does not need any a-priori knowledge of the system or other players. Based on (29), FP is defined as any rule that assigns the best response to agent i given its current estimation of the opponent policy θ t i (a −i ). Usually, such an operation is represented by a t i (a −i ) ∈ BR i (θ t i (a −i )), where the operator BR(·) derives the best-response action set. Typically, BR i can be derived by minimizing the estimated expected payoff of agent i:
The convergence property of FP in a general repeated game is given by Theorem 3 [41] . 7 Studies adopting the same mutual interference model as in (18) within the framework of repeated games can be found in [110] . In [110] , the best response without docition ensures the convergence to the Pareto dominant equilibria. Theorem 3 gives the sufficient condition for FP to converge to an NE. Thereby, the convergence of FP-based learning is guaranteed in any repeated games that possess at least one pure-strategy NE. According to Theorem 3, a typical way of checking the convergence condition for FP in a game is to check if the game possesses certain properties (such as being potential or S-modular [32] ) that guarantees the existence of a pure-strategy NE.
Theorem 3 (Convergence of FP
As long as agents are able to observe the actions of the rival agents or afford the overhead for action information exchange, FP can be employed as the basic solution for many resource management games in wireless networks. In [114] , a FP-based multi-agent learning algorithm is employed by the secondary nodes in an ad-hoc DSA network to learn the strategies for forwarding delay-sensitive packets. With the learning scheme proposed in [114] , each SU needs to collect the information about the spectrum opportunity matrix locally, and establish its local interference matrix according to the action information collected from its neighbors. Then, every SU tracks the frequency of action selection by its neighbors according to a modified version of (28) with a discounting factor κ t−1 i
. Each SU also needs to determine a subset of feasible actions that do not interfere with higher priority traffic. This is done through estimating the expected interference based on the policy estimation model in (29) . The local deterministic best response is calculated based on minimizing the expected effective transmission time over the candidate links. In [115] , FP is applied to obtain a defense mechanism against eavesdropping and jamming attacks in the uplink of a cellular network consisting of multiple relays (Figure 12 ). In the defense-attack game, the normal/malicious nodes are assumed to be able to observe the actions of other nodes, so they can use the models in (28) and (29) to estimate the other nodes' policies. Instead of directly obtaining a deterministic strategy based on the local best response, each normal node updates its mixed strategy at time slot t as follows [44] :
in which m is the index of the candidate relays. The malicious node adopts a similar policy-updating rule based on its own action set for attacking. The actions of each node at round t are selected from the best response based on the expected private utility with the locally estimated policy vector (π t i , θ t i ). The same learning rule as in [115] can be found in [116] , which uses the local policy updating rule in (30) to learn the strategy in a continuous strategy space for power allocation. In [116] , such a learning scheme is referred to as the best response dynamics of the power allocation game, and is proved to be able to converge to the ǫ-equilibria. The same learning rule is also adopted in [117] , which formulates a hierarchical network formation game for nodes in a multi-hop wireless 8 This is equivalent to the condition when the best-response payoffs in the NE are strictly greater than the other possible payoffs for all the agents. Fig. 12 . A network consisting of M one-hop relays and N wireless users that is subject to eavesdropping/jamming from one active malicious node [115] .
network to select relays. In [117] the relay selection game is decomposed into multi-layers and solved using a backward induction method from the sink to the source. The learning scheme defined by (28)- (30) is applied to each layer-game and the mixed strategies are obtained from the local best responses.
With the standard FP, local actions are updated based on the best responses, which are generally of pure strategies. As pointed out by [41] , one drawback of such an FP-based learning scheme lies in the discontinuity of agent behaviors, for a small change in the opponent-policy estimation may result in an abrupt local-behavior change. Due to this, a Smoothed-FP (SFP) procedure was proposed through searching the best response with a modified local objective function that is perturbed by a differentiable, strictly concave function. Assume that the best response is obtained through maximizing a payoff function u i (π i , π −i ). Then the operation for obtaining the smoothed best response BR(·) can be used to replace the original best response arg max u i (π i , π −i ):
in which the perturbation function η i is typically given as the entropy function of π i :
Problem (31) with (32) can be explicitly solved as:
in which λ is the weight of the perturbation term that controls the strategy exploration rate. It has been proved that for any average-reward repeated game, we can always find the λ that makes the payoff of agent n under BR(π −n ) to be sufficiently near the real best-response payoff (Proposition 4.5 of [41] ). The SFP-based learning scheme is also known as the stochastic FP. Unlike standard FP, in SFP it is not necessary to observe the opponents' actions or even know the structure of the local utility functions. Instead, the expected payoff u t i (a i , π −i ) in (33) is estimated based on local information as follows: (34) in which κ t n and I(a t n , a n ) follow the same definitions as in (28), andũ t n (a n ) is the estimate of the expected utility u t i (a i , π −i ). The local mixed policy is usually updated in the following form:
in which BR(ũ t i (a i )) is calculated based on (33) with (34) and η(t) is a learning factor.
With the property of requiring no information exchange, SFP is considered an important tool in self-organized learning for resource allocation games. In [118] , SFP is applied to the power control game in wireless ad-hoc networks. Although SFP does not necessarily converge to the NE in a general repeated game, it has been shown in [49] that for a supermodular/potential game [32] , SFP is guaranteed to converge to a stationary point (with a non-zero probability to an NE). In order to take advantage of such a property, a supermodular utility function is designed for each node in [118] , and the convergence with SFP is thus guaranteed. However, since the utility function in [118] is monotonically decreasing, the learning scheme will finally converge to the unique NE of that game, which corresponds to all users transmitting with zero power. This problem of utility function design is addressed in [90] by studying the power allocation problem in a small-cell network through a non-trivial Stackelberg game [32] . This game design is intended to balance the femtocell power efficiency and interference control in the macrocell. The supermodularity property is retained for the femto link utility and the SFP-based scheme (33-35) is applied to the follower game among the femtocells. The same learning mechanism is adopted in [89] , which considers the power allocation in the femtocells as a common-payoff game (thus a potential game). With the assumption of the common-payoff game, it is proved in [89] that the ǫ-equilibrium is guaranteed to be reached in the potential game by the SFP-based learning algorithm.
2) Gradient Play: Compared with FP, Gradient Play (GP) adjusts the strategy of one agent based on the gradient ascent dynamics instead of directly jumping to the best response based on the empirical frequencies of the opponent agents' action selection. Therefore, GP can be viewed as a "better response" algorithm. Mathematically, in the standard GP each agent in the repeated game updates its strategy on selecting a i according to [44] :
where ǫ t is the time-varying step size, [·] Si defines the projection onto the strategy space of agent i, θ t i (a −i ) is the estimated opponent-action frequency, which can be derived following (29) , and q t i (a i ) is the estimated local-action frequency, which can be derived in the same manner as (30) :
where action a t i is generated as random outcomes of the evolving strategies q t i . Based on (36), Derivative-Action GP (DAGP) was further developed in [44] . By introducing parameter r t i (a i ) to approximate the first-order derivative of q i , the updating mechanism of DAGP is defined as follows [119] : (36) , and λ t is a large factor satisfying λ t > 0. According to [44] , [119] , for large λ t > 0, if ǫ satisfies certain conditions (see Theorem 4.2 of [44] and Theorem 3.3 in [119] ), the strategy π t i is asymptotically locally stable and converges to the NE with a non-zero probability.
GP and DAGP not only require the agents to be able to track the frequency of both the local actions and the opponent actions, but also require that the structure of local utility functions is known to each agent. Compared with FP and SFP, the most important feature of the GP-based learning algorithms is that the updating mechanism can be easily extended to the cases of continuous games. In [120] , standard GP is applied to the continuous, random medium access game, in which a set of wireless nodes learn to play the random access strategies p i (v i ≤ p i ≤ w i and 0 ≤ v i < w i ≤ 1) after observing the vector of channel contention signal q i . Instead of directly adapting to the contention signal q i , each wireless node introduces a price function C i (q i ) to adjust its local net payoff with the original utility function
In [120] , the random access game is proved to have a unique nontrivial NE (namely,
, and that the standard GP is able to converge geometrically to the nontrivial NE if a certain condition is satisfied with the step size ǫ t in (36) . The application of standard GP can also be found in the power-control game of a multi-cell CDMA network with dynamic handoffs between cells [121] . After introducing a pricing mechanism with the cost function based on the local power consumption, the game formulation in [121] adopts a payoff function that is twice continuously differentiable, non-decreasing and strictly convex. It is proved in [121] that standard GP is able to exponentially converge to the smallest convex set which contains all the possible NE of the powercontrol game, if the spreading factor of the CDMA system satisfies some conditions 9 . One typical example of applying the DAGP-based learning to networking problems can be found in [122] , which formulates the interference coordination problem in a multi-link MIMO system as a noncooperative game. In the game, the covariance matrix of the signal of each link is considered as the local strategy and is drawn from a common, continuous strategy space. The matrix form of (39) is adopted and guarantees to converge to the unique NE of the game, if the covariance matrix of the total interference and noise at the receiver of each link satisfies a certain condition.
3) Learning Automata: As introduced in Section II-A, LA is featured by the process of action selection based on policy estimation using only local information. In the framework of network control games, most of the LA-based learning schemes are employed to obtain NE policies. As a special 9 "Exponential convergence" is used to describe the property of learning when asymptotically converging to the convex set. If π t i − π * i = O(µ t ) for some µ < 1, we say that the learning process achieves exponential convergence.
case of the general LA updating rule (11), L R−I learning has been widely applied to network control problems due to its simplicity and convergence property. By abusing the notations in (11), the rules of L R−I learning can be expressed as (40) :
where λ (0 < λ < 1) is a learning parameter. The property of convergence to the NE for the learning mechanism in (40) in a general noncooperative game has been proven in [123] : However, no uniform expression is provided in the literature to obtain the normalized functionr t i in (40) . For example, in [124] , standard L R−I learning is adopted to manage the opportunistic spectrum access by N SUs over M primary channels with a fixed transmit rate R m on channel m. In this case, the normalized random rewardr t i is obtained as follows:
in which r t m is the instantaneous reward of SU m after considering the PU activities and the channel contention with its rival nodes. The opportunistic spectrum access game is further modeled as an exact potential game. Therefore, at lease one pure-strategy NE exists for the game [32] . According to Theorem 4, L R−I learning ensures the convergence to the pure-strategy NE in the opportunistic spectrum access game. Apart from [124] , the direct applications of the standard L R−I learning scheme (with the convergence property of Theorem 4 and the pure-strategy NE existence condition) is also employed by a number of studies, which range from relay-selection in the cooperative network [125] to the CSMA-based DSA management [126] and the MIMO-based DSA management [127] in the CRNs. In contrast to these works, the variation of the standard L R−I learning mechanism using a different strategy-updating rule can also be found in the studies such as [128] . In [128] , a discrete power control problem in a CDMAlike cellular network with mutual interference is modeled as a repeated noncooperative game. In the power control game, each node only knows its local payoff measured as the power efficiency. The modified linear-reward-inaction updating rule in [128] is defined as follows:
Let u t i denote the utility of node i by choosing an discrete power level a t i for transmission at time t. Then, the normalized utility feedbackr t i is obtained as follows:
The major difference between (42) and (40) lies in the way of updating the probability of choosing an action when the action results in a new reward. Under this learning algorithm, the evolution of the power selection becomes a Markov process. Following the same approach of proving the convergence property based on Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) analysis and Lyapunov's stability theorem as in [123] , it is proved in [128] that the LA-based learning scheme in (42) will only converge to the mixed-strategy NE of the considered power control game if the learning step λ is sufficiently small. In addition to L R−I learning, other learning schemes based on the general LA updating rule in (11) are also employed by research on resource allocation in the CRNs. In [129] , an LA mechanism based on the softmax (Logit) function is applied to learn the ǫ-optimal solution to the traffic allocation problem in a multi-hop cognitive wireless mesh network. With the proposed LA mechanism, node i's local action to select link k for transmitting at the q-th possible rate is determined by the softmax function:
where Q denotes the number of possible transmit rates and w q i,k is updated according to the following LA rules 10 :
In (45), τ (t) (0 < τ (t) < 1) is the learning rate and ξ 
t). Ξ(t)
is the normalized utility feedback that is provided by the gateway node. In order to ensure the convergence of the learning algorithm in (45), the traffic engineering game is modeled as a team game with the identical payoff (hence a potential game). Thus the SUs need to share the information on the global, normalized utility feedback Ξ(t) for updating the value of w q i,k (t). In [129] , the value of Ξ(t) is obtained from arbitrarily scaling the sum of the local payoff functions down to the range of [0, 1]. By allowing information exchange and constructing an N -person potential game, it is proved in [129] that for a sufficiently small value of τ and σ, the LA mechanism in (45) is guaranteed to achieve the ǫ-optimal solution to the traffic engineering problem.
In [130] , Bush-Mosteller LA [43] is adopted for learning the NE of the repeated power control game in a CRN with the set of power constraints on the aggregated interference experienced by each PU (Figure 13 ). Bush-Mosteller learning, also known as the linear reward-penalty LA, can be viewed as a general form of L R−I learning [131] . In [130] , the CRN is assumed to be composed of N SUs and M PUs. The wireless channels are assumed to be stationary and the SUs are able to monitor each PU's feedback indicating the sum of interference to each PU receiver. It is also assumed that no SU can observe the strategies of the other SUs (see Figure 13 ). Let U k (π k , π −k ) be the expected utility of SU link k and Q l (π k , π −k ) be the corresponding expected interference at PU l, the constrained game is transformed into an unconstrained game with the help of the Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrange function of SU k is defined with a regularization term δ/2 π k 2 − λ λ λ k as follows:
in which λ l is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint from PU l, λ λ λ k is the vector of λ l and C l is the maximum level of the interference to PU l. It is shown in [130] that finding the equilibrium point of the original constrained power control game is asymptotically equivalent to determining the equilibrium point of the unconstrained game with the regularized function given in (46) . The following learning scheme, based on linear reward-penalty LA, is adopted to update the local policies:
where P t k is the power level that SU k chooses at iteration t. e N k (P t k ) and e N k are defined as follows:
The normalized utility feedback ξ t k is obtained based on the Lagrangian with the expected utility and interference being replaced by the instantaneous payoff and interference in (46) . With a user-defined normalization procedure, the value of ξ t k is scaled within the interval [0, 1] 11 . The time-varying correction (adaptation) factors γ t k also belong to the unit segment. Meanwhile, the Lagrange multiplier is updated as:
ψ NE, provided that the sequences {η t l } and {δ t } satisfy certain properties (see Assumptions A1-A3 in [130] ), and the power control game is diagonal concave [43] . Compared with L R−I learning, Bush-Mosteller LA requires stricter condition for converging to the NE. This is a major reason for impeding Bush-Mosteller learning from being widely applied to the wireless resource allocation problems. Due to the requirement for the game to be diagonal concave, and because the original SINR-based utility does not naturally possess the property of diagonal concavity, [130] uses an arbitrarily designed utility function to replace the real expected mutual-interference-based local utility in order to derive the proper payoff function for the constructed power control game.
4) No-Regret Learning:
Usually, the terminology "noregret learning" is used to refer to any learning algorithm that exhibits the property of no-regret when compared with the set of some designated strategies [45] , [132] . Formally, for an infinitely repeated game G = N , A = ×A n , {r n } n∈N , and given the adversary (deterministic) strategy a −i , the regret of agent i for playing strategy π i instead of choosing strategy a i can be defined as the difference in its payoff obtained from playing these strategies:
Let φ(·) denote a modification mapping π
Then, for a sequence of adversary strategies {a t −i }, we can define a general no-regret learning algorithm (also known as φ-no-regret learning) for agent i as follows [132] : Definition 6 (φ-no-regret learning). For a finite subset Φ of memoryless mapping φ, a learning algorithm that generates π t i is said to exhibit φ-no-regret if the regret of that learning algorithm, (53) satisfies the following condition:
There are two well-studied categories of the φ-no-regret properties: no-external-regret and no-internal-regret [132] . The no-external-regret property is to minimize the regret with respect to any comparison class of algorithms that leads to deterministic strategies. In other words, for no-external-regret learning the mapping φ(·) satisfies φ(π i ) = a (a ∈ A i ). The no-internal-regret property is also known as no-swap-regret since the property of internal regret swaps the current online strategies as follows:
One well-known example for applying no-external-regret learning to the wireless networking problems is [133] , which uses the random weighted majority (a.k.a., Hedge) algorithm [134] for learning the NE strategies in a channel-allocation game in a CRN. With a careful utility design, the channelallocation game is proved to be an exact potential game. Let U t i (a i ) denote the cumulated instantaneous payoff received by SU i given the sequence of the adversary strategy {a t −i }, the mixed policy of SU i is updated as follows:
in which β > 0. It is well-known that the learning scheme in (56) has a regret bound as D T i ≤ β/2 [52] . Compared with the widely applied best-response-based learning schemes for potential games, which also ensure the convergence to the NE, the random weighted majority algorithm (56) does not need any information sharing between SUs.
The construction of a no-external-regret learning mechanism can be further illustrated by the example of [135] , where the problem of collaborative sensing with malicious nodes in an N -channel CRN is studied. In the considered CRN, an SU m j is supposed to collaborate with a set of its neighbor SUs M j and choose whether to aggregate one of their sensing reports into its local channel-state prediction. At time t, a mixed policy π
] is adopted to choose the reports from the SUs in M j . With the goal of minimizing the long-term expected loss due to false decision by choosing the sequence π t instead of the pure-strategy best response (internal regret), we have
in which l j (m j ′ , s t ) is the instantaneous loss due to adopting the report by SU m j ′ , and l j (π j t , s t ) is the average loss with policy π π π j t at channel state
In [135] , such a decision process is modeled as a two-player constant-sum game. In the game, SU m j plays against nature, which plays as an adversary player and chooses state s aiming at bring the worst cost to SU m j . The strategy-updating mechanism is designed upon the softmax function (44) with the accumulated instantaneous loss
being the argument of the logarithmic function exp(·). It is shown in [135] that no-regret learning based on the softmax function is able to converge to the NE, which is equivalent to the minimax value of the game.
Another category of no-regret learning algorithms that are widely applied in the context of network control aims at minimizing the internal regret and learning the CE in repeated games [45] . For a general repeated game G = N , A = ×A n , {r n } n∈N , the estimated average loss for agent i to play action a t i instead of playing a ′ i at time t is given by:
Based on (58), the regret of agent i for not playing a
With (59), the mixed policy of agent i is updated by
where µ is a sufficiently large constant to ensure that π i (i ∈ N ) is well-defined. Like the random weighted majority algorithm, the learning scheme defined by (58)- (60) to learn the CE does not need the agents to exchange the action/utility information. The nointernal-regret learning scheme ensures the asymptotic convergence to the set of the CE, according to Theorem 5 [45] : (58)- (60), the empirical distribution of the joint action selection:
Theorem 5. If every agent plays according to the learning scheme defined by
converges almost surely to the set of CE of the game G as T → ∞.
The applications of the learning scheme (58)- (60) to network control problems can be found in [136] - [139] . As one of the earliest works that employ no-regret learning in the network control problem, [136] aims at obtaining the CE in a dynamic spectrum access game with an overlay CR network. No-regret learning is used for the SUs to address the problem of channel contention. It is shown that the performance at the CE obtained through learning is almost as good as the optimal equilibrium in the set of CE. In [137] , a joint powerchannel selection problem is studied in an underlay CRN with a free band and a set of price-charging PU channels. The no-regret learning algorithm (58)- (60) is aggregated with an auction game, which considers the SINR to the PU or the allocation power as an item for auction. The joint powerchannel selection game is played in two levels. In the lowerlevel subgame, the SUs perform the SINR/power bidding game with a fixed set of PU-channel selection. In the higherlevel subgame, the SUs adopt the no-regret learning algorithm (58)- (60) to obtain the CE in the channel-selection game. In [138] , the learning scheme of (58)- (60) is adopted to obtain the CE strategies in a spectrum sensing game among heterogeneous SUs in an overlay CRN. In the game, each SU chooses either to cooperatively sense the PU channel that it is assigned to with some power consumption (i.e., with some cost), or to directly access the channel as a free rider (i.e., without any cost) based on the sensing reports by the neighbor SUs. With the proposed no-regret learning scheme, the strategies are obtained based on minimizing the total regret of the neighborhood set of an SU rather than the individual regret. It is shown in [138] that the learning scheme with the neighborhood regret can significantly outperform the learning algorithm based on the local regret. This is also considered as the main reason that motivates local SUs to share their local action and payoff information for neighborhood learning. In [139] , the scheme in (58)- (60) is applied to learn the CE of the subcarrier allocation strategies in a multi-cell OFDMA network. Again, each link in the subcarrier allocation game does not need to know the private strategies and utilities of the other links.
The no-internal-regret learning scheme (58)- (60) only requires that the structure of the local payoff function is known to each agent. Compared with the NE-driven learning methods such as FP and best-response learning, no-internal-regret learning could achieve a better social performance (i.e., in terms of sum of the players' rewards). Since the set of CE is a convex polytope with all the NE lying on its boundary [140] , it is possible for the no-internal-regret learning algorithm to reach a CE that is not on the boundary of the polytope, hence resulting in a better performance than any NE. Although the learning rule of (58)- (60) does not guarantee convergence to the social optimal CE, a number of empirical studies (e.g., no-regret learning in the cognitive congestion control games [141] , [142] ) show that the no-regret learning scheme can significantly outperform best-response learning and FP [141] , and its convergent strategy can be considered as a good approximation of the global optimal solution [142] . As a result, many studies consider the no-internal-regret learning scheme as an approach to implicitly enforce cooperation within the framework of general-sum noncooperative games.
E. Applications of Learning in the Context of Stochastic Games (SGs)
SGs generalizes both the repeated games and the MDPs by allowing the payoff of the players at each round of the game to be dependent on the state variable, whose evolution is influenced by the joint actions of the players. Compared with repeated-game-based models, SGs are considered a more practical tool for modeling the agent interaction in a stochastic wireless environment, especially when the elements of the wireless environment (e.g., channel states, buffer states, collision states, etc.) evolve stochastically and are influenced by the transmission strategies of the wireless agents. In the context of SGs, the model-free learning schemes are referred to the value/policy-iteration algorithms (e.g., the algorithms summarized in [143] ) that do not require any a-priori knowledge about the state transition of the wireless system. We note that such a property makes model-free learning especially appropriate for finding the solution to the equilibria of the SGs in the context of wireless networks. This is because in most of the practical scenarios it is difficult to obtain all the details of the system dynamics due to the complexity of the network. In what follows, we organize our survey on learning in SGs according to the approach followed for experience updating (i.e., value-iteration-based learning vs. non-valueiteration-based learning).
1) Value-Iteration-Based Learning:
In contrast to those model-based solutions which use linear programming to obtain the NE (see the example for in a constrained power-control SG [144] ), value-iteration-based learning algorithms generally need to construct a series of intermediate "matrix games" from the original SGs. Consider as an example a general discountedreward SG, G = N , S, A, {r n } n∈N , Pr(s ′ |s, a) , a matrix game is defined based on the current estimation of the state value of the SG, which is derived in the similar way as (4): i (s, a) ).
end while Definition 7 (Matrix game [39] ). An n-player matrix game (also known as stage game) in an SG is defined as a tuple
(1 ≤ i ≤ |N |) is given by:
We note that in (62)
Under policy π, transition probability Pr(s ′ |s, π) can be expressed as follows:
. . .
(63) According to Definition 7, the general form of strategysearching algorithms based on value iteration can be implemented as Algorithm 1 [143] . In (64) of Algorithm 1, operator Eval π (·) computes (estimates) the expected payoff in the NE of the matrix game. The equivalence between the NE of the matrix game and the NE of the discounted SG is given by Theorem 6:
Theorem 6 ([39]). The following are equivalent:
• π * is an equilibrium point in the discounted SG, G, with equilibrium payoffs (V β,1 (π * ), . . . , V β,|N | (π * )).
• For each s ∈ S, strategy π * (s) constitutes an equilibrium point in static matrix game G(s) with equilibrium payoffs (Eval π * (Q β,1 (s, a) |N | (s, a) )). The value ofQ β,i (s, a) is given by Definition 7.
According to Theorem 6, Algorithm 1 can be considered a combination of a matrix-game solver and a value-iterationbased state value learner. It works as the general form of a set of model-free strategy-learning algorithms, which differ from each other only in the way of defining operator Eval π (·). In [36] , operator Eval π (·) in value iteration is implemented by a minimax optimization process, and the Q-value of each learning agent is updated through a standard single-agent Q-learning process. Such a learning scheme is known as minimax-Q learning. Specifically, the learning mechanism can be expressed by
The solution to (67) is usually obtained through linear programming, which requires that the matrix game of the SG is of complete information. It is worth pointing out that (66) is an approximation of the exact state value, a)π(s t , a) , which cannot be obtained directly since the local strategies are usually private information. Due to the approximation, the updating mechanism in (65)- (67), although proved to be effective by empirical studies [36] , does not provide a strict condition for convergence to the NE.
Minimax-Q learning is usually adopted to solve the problems which can be described as a constant-sum (also known as strictly competitive) game. One typical category of its applications in wireless networks is strategy-learning in attackdefense problems, since such problems can usually be modeled as a two-player, zero-sum game with the group of normal nodes and the group of malicious nodes treated as two super players. In [145] , a two-player zero-sum SG is adopted to model the anti-jamming process of a group of SUs in the CRN (Figure 14) . Due to the random activities of the PUs, the channel-availability states viewed by the SUs are modeled as a group of independent, binary-state Markov chains. In addition, for each channel, the channel quality measured by the local SNR is modeled as a finite state Markov chain. In [145] , the devices in the CRN are divided into two groups: the normal SUs and jamming nodes. Both the normal SUs and the attackers access the PU channels in a slotted manner. At each time slot, the normal SUs will select a subset of channels for transmission while the attackers will select a subset of channels for jamming. The group of channels that are selected for transmission are further subdivided into control channels and data channels. For a normal SU, the non-zero gain of a channel can only be achieved when the channel is used for data transmission and at least one control channel selected by the normal SU is not jammed by the attackers. The goal of the normal SUs is to maximize the local channel utility. Based on the formulation of the two-player zero-sum SG, the standard minimax-Q-learning algorithm is applied for the normal SUs to find the equilibrium strategies in the stochastic attack-defense game. Convergence of the learning algorithm has been shown by empirical studies. Also, the numerical simulations show that minimax-Q learning outperforms both the myopic strategy, which does not consider the future payoff, and the fixed strategy, which uniformly selects the channels regardless of the attacker's strategy.
The application of minimax-Q learning in a similar scenarios can be found in [146] , which formulates the competition for open access spectrum in a tactical wireless network as a competitive mobile network game. The study in [146] extends the attack-defense model in [145] by dividing the competitive mobile network into two sub-networks: the ally network and the enemy network. Each network is composed of both communicating nodes and jamming nodes. The goal of the two networks is to achieve the maximum spectrum utility while jamming the opponent transmission as much as possible. The channel-availability state is jointly determined by the transmission-jamming actions of the two networks as a controlled Markov chain. Channel access in the competitive network is modeled as a two-player, zero-sum game, and standard minimax-Q learning is adopted for both the ally and the enemy network to learn their equilibrium strategies. Apart from [146] , other applications of minimax-Q learning can be found in [147] , [148] , which basically adopt the same framework of the two-player, zero-sum SG as in [145] , [146] to obtain the anti-jamming scheme. In [147] , minimax-Q learning in the SG is employed in a typical DSA network without considering the impact of jamming the control channels. In [148] , the two-player SG model is extended to the scenarios of stochastic routing in a MANET, and the attack-proof strategy is obtained through minimax-Q learning. For networking problems that need to be described as an nplayer general-sum SG, a more general learning scheme can be implemented by replacing the minimax operator for Eval π (·) with the operator that leads to the payoff of the NE in the general game. For the discounted-reward general-sum SGs, such a learning scheme is known as Nash Q-learning [38] . Nash Q-learning adopts the same Q-value updating scheme (65) as in the minimax-Q learning algorithm, and requires that the value of V t β,i (s t ) is obtained based on the matrix game NE of the SG. According to Theorem 6, as long as the NE of each matrix game obtained from the SG in stage s t is used in (65) to compute the value of V t β,i (s t ), the learning process converges to the NE of the SG. For Nash Q-learning, operator Eval π (·) can be expressed by:
In (68), π * i (s) is the NE strategy of the matrix game at stage t when the payoff matrix of agent i is Q t β,i (s, a). Theorem 6 also holds when the SG is based on average reward. The counterpart to Nash Q-learning in an averagereward SG is known as Nash R-learning [39] . Nash R-learning adopts the R-learning-based scheme for state-action updating as in (8) and (9), which can be summarized by the following equations:
where V t i (s) is the equilibrium payoff of the stage game, and is computed following (68) .
When the goal of the learning process is to find the CE of the discounted-reward SG instead of the NE, Correlated-Q (CE-Q) Learning can be implemented based on the updating mechanism in (65)- (67) with the state value V t β,i (s t ) estimated at the CE strategies [40] . The equivalence between the CE of the original SG and the CE of the matrix game in each state still holds. Based on Definition 3 and Theorem 6, we have Theorem 7 (CE in the SG [40] ). For a discounted-reward SG G, a stationary policy π is a correlated equilibrium if ∀i ∈ N , ∀s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A with π i (a i ) > 0, for all a
which defines the CE of the matrix game in s as π(s).
For both the NE based Q-learning (Nash-Q and Nash-R) and the CE-based Q-learning (CE-Q), it is not specified how the equilibrium strategies π * i (s) for each matrix game is obtained during the learning process. Since it is necessary for the game to be of complete information in order to immediately obtain the NE/CE of the matrix game, it is required that the learning agents should keep track of the entire Q-table from all the other agents at state s in order to compute the exact stage-game equilibrium. In practice, exchanging such information will result in a large transmission overhead, which is usually unaffordable in a wireless network. As a result, most of the existing studies apply heuristic methods to approximate the matrix game equilibrium. One example of payoff approximation at the NE of the matrix game can be found in [149] , which decouples the wireless network into a group of Service Providers (SPs) and a single entity called Network Operators (NOs) for network virtualization. Each SP is responsible for reallocating the available spectrum resources to a group of end users, while the NO is responsible for allocating the time-varying spectrum resources to the SPs. Here, resource allocation through the interface between the NO and the SPs at each time slot is treated as an auction game with the NO acting as the auctioneer and the SPs acting as the bidders. The auction is performed with the Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism [32] . The entire auction process in the stochastic environment is modeled as a discounted generalsum SG, in which the channel state and the traffic state are assumed to be Markovian and the SP action is the selection of value functions through choosing the transmit rate. In [149] , the matrix games of the original SG is referred to as the "current games". Also, to avoid directly computing the value of V β,i (s) in (68), a conjecture price which approximates the unit-rate price (strategy) of the NO in the future is introduced. A Q-value updating scheme which is analogous to the SASbased Q-learning scheme is proposed, and the value of the conjecture price is updated using the subgradient method.
For networking problems which do not possess the singleserver-distributed-agents property as stochastic auction games, the equilibrium strategies can be learned by implementing an appropriate amount of local information exchange. In [150] , the problem of traffic offloading in a stochastic heterogeneous cellular network is first formulated as a centralized discretetime MDP and then as an SG. In the SG, a group of macrocell BSs try to offload their downlink traffic to their corresponding group of small-cell BSs, which operate in the open access mode and share the same band with the macro BSs. Before the learning is implemented, [150] employs a standard state abstraction procedure based on linear state-value combination (see our discussion in Section III-A). The Q-values (i.e., the payoff of matrix games) are updated with the gradientascending method based on the gradient of the new Q-values after state abstraction. The matrix game in a given state s is modeled as a "virtual game" with common payoff by allowing the macro BSs to share their instantaneous spectrum utility with each other. Also, the action of each BS is updated using ǫ-exploration instead of directly computing the mixed strategy of the matrix game. It is proved in [150] that convergence (which may not be the NE) is guaranteed with probability one.
A different approach to approximate the matrix game equilibrium with only local information in the SG can be found in [151] , [152] , which employ the learning methods for the repeated games to learn the matrix game equilibrium strategies and then use these intermediate strategies to approximate the state value V π * β,i (s) of the original SG. In [151] , the interference mitigation problem with a finite action set of discrete powers for both the PUs and the SUs in a CRN is modeled as a discounted-reward SG. In [152] , the cross-layer resource allocation problem for layered video transmission in a CRN is modeled as a discounted-reward SG. In both works, the goal of strategy learning is to find the CE of their respective SG. Both works treat the matrix game at state s ∈ S as a repeated game, and adopt the no-internal-regret learning method defined by (58)- (60) to approximate the CE strategy π * i (s) at state s. Letπ i (s) define the intermediate strategy that is obtained with (60) . Since with the no-internal-regret learning scheme, no action/payoff information exchange is needed, the strategy estimation in the SG is solely based on local information. The same method as in (65) is adopted for Q-value updating, for which state value V π * β,i (s) under the CE strategy can be estimated as the expected payoff of the matrix game:
To further reduce the information-exchange overhead, the value ofπ t (s t , a) and Q t β,i (s t , a) can be replaced by the conditional local strategy (given the adversary actions) and the Q-table based on the local state-action pairs [152] , repectively. Such a two-fold, approximate learning scheme does not require the information exchange between wireless devices. However, compared with the original learning scheme in Algorithm 1, such a learning algorithm may suffer from using the non-CE policies in the matrix game and from the inaccurate estimation of V t β,i (s t ). Although empirical studies show that convergence can be achieved by the two-fold learning scheme, no theoretical support is known that guarantees the convergence to the CE.
2) Conjecture-Based Learning: Consider the problem of unguaranteed convergence due to the inaccurate estimation of the equilibrium strategies in the matrix games with two-fold learning, the concept of "conjecture" [50] about one player's opponent policies is introduced in several recent studies [153] , [154] . In an SG, the conjecture of agent i can be defined as any belief function c i : S × A i → C, in which C is the space of agent i's conjectures (e.g., about the opponents' policies, states, etc.). In the case of policy conjecture, we can define c t i (s, a −i ) as the conjecture of opponent policy π −i (s) by agent i at time t. With only local information, the most wellaccepted conjecture updating mechanism is (73) is obtained based upon the assumption that the other players will be able to observe player i's deviation from the reference point π t i (s, a i ), and in response to such a deviation, they will deviate from their own reference point by a quantity that is proportional to this deviation [50] . With conjecture c i (s, a −i ), the conjecture equilibrium can be defined as follows (extended from the definition in [153] 
We take [154] as an example to explain the details of employing conjecture to learn in SGs. In [154] , the power allo- (Figure 15 ) is studied. The multi-node power allocation process is modeled as an SG, in which the local binary state of a secondary link is determined by the SINR level of its receiver. The local payoff is measured by the power efficiency. Compared with the standard matrix-game-based strategy-learning mechanism in (64)- (65), [154] constructs the Q-table with only local states and actions. Here, the policy conjecture is introduced to approximately learn the matrix game equilibrium strategy and the Q-value of the SG. Based on the conjecture-updating scheme in (73) , the Q-value updating mechanism is defined as follows:
The local policy π i is updated using the Logit function (44) . It is proved in [154] that the second term on the right-hand side of (76) is a contraction mapping operator and the learning scheme converges with sufficiently large number of iterations.
3) Other Learning Algorithms in SGs: For algorithms that do not work in the framework of hierarchical learning that is separated into learning in the matrix games and the original SG, we simply refer them to the category of the "other learning algorithms". In these algorithms, the Q-learning-based valueiteration scheme for the payoff of the matrix game may not necessarily be applied, or the computation of the state value of the SG may not be needed. Due to the complexity of a general SG, most of the existing learning methods in this category cannot be represented by a single prototypical algorithm.
We note that for an SG, the property of the MDP generally requires that the state value of the game be computed following the Bellman optimality equation (in the general form as (3)), whenever a stationary policy is to be obtained. Extending from the value-iteration-based algorithm, we can construct a general learning scheme, which is composed of two learning loops: an inner loop that uses an appropriate scheme to approximate the SG equilibrium strategies π * and an outer loop that employs an appropriate method to estimate the state value V β,i (s) of each player. Within this general framework, the construction of matrix games is not necessary. We can generalize the two-layer learning process in SG G = N , S, A, {r n } n∈N , Pr(s ′ |s, a) as Algorithm 2.
One widely-adopted two-layer approach for strategy learning in wireless SGs is to adopt FP-based policy updating as the inner-loop learning scheme. Such an approach of policy evolution can be found rooted in the model-based learning algorithms (namely, with known state-transition maps) [155] . Since the standard FP-based algorithm with (28) and (29) requires that each wireless node to track the opponent actions, extending FP-based learning from repeated games to the SG is considered a challenge due to the explosion of state-action dimensionality. In [156] , such a challenge is resolved by regulating the SG into a sequential game, in which only one wireless node is allowed to update its action in each round. In [156] , the problem of joint channel selection and power allocation for the SUs in an overlay DSA network is studied. With the assumption of sequential game, each SU adopts a standard SAS-based Q-learning scheme as in (7) for updating the Q-table based on the local state-action pairs. To further reduce the state-action space, Q-learning is only applied to the strategy-learning for channel selection. The power adaptation is performed only after the channels are selected by the SUs. The FP-based mixed-strategy-updating scheme in [156] can be considered as a variation of the best-response-based strategy learning schemes described in (30) .
It is also necessary to consider a different approach to update the state value for FP-based learning when the players in the SGs update their strategies simultaneously, because the state value of the MDP cannot be easily estimated by only tracking the opponents' actions. For those works that directly estimate the state value without using the TD-learning-based methods, it is also necessary to track the frequency of state transition in order to estimate the state transition probabilities. Examples of learning the state transition can be found in [61] , [62] . In [61] , secondary wireless stations compete with each other for network resources to transmit delay-sensitive in a stochastic CRN. In [62] , a similar problem is specified in an overlay CRN with SUs competing for the vacant primary channels and determining transmitting parameters in a cross-layer manner. In both works, with the resource allocation problem in the CRN being modeled as SGs, it is required that the state transition frequencies of the opponents' local states is tracked by each SU. In order to reduce the information exchange overhead about local state transitions, an SU abstracts the state space by classifying the opponent SUs' state space purely based on its local observation. Instead of learning the real state-transition frequencies, the transitions of the abstracted state is recorded. The state value of the SG is updated based on the reduced states using the standard Bellman optimality equation (3).
The special structure of some SGs can also be exploited to simplify the learning process for the FP-based learning mechanism. One example of such exploitation can be found in [157] , which models the distributed dynamic routing in multihop CRNs as an SG (Figure 16 ). Since the states of the routing SG in [157] is defined as the state of channel availability in the CRN, the SG is featured by the state transitions which only depend on the PU activities. The SUs in the network attempt to find the route for minimizing the packet-forwarding delay due to queueing and channel collision while keeping their interference to the PUs as small as possible. Since the delay over a path is equal to the accumulated delay caused by each link in the path, and the state transition is independent of the SU's actions, the original SG in [157] can be decomposed into a group of layered, stochastic subgames. Each subgame cor- responds to a hierarchy level 12 in the routing path (see Figure  16 ). The structure (i.e., the payoff matrix) of each subgame can only be determined when the cost (measured in delay) of the next-layer game is determined. A backward induction mechanism is adopted in [157] to compute the equilibrium payoff in the layered routing game. The computation starts from the subgame of the layer which ends at the sink SU to the subgame of the layer which begins from the source SU. Since the state transition is independent of the SU's actions, the stochastic subgame in each layer can be reduced to a group of repeated games with fixed states. Therefore, the learning of state value become unnecessary and FP-based learning guarantees the convergence to the global NE, as long as the equilibrium cost of each subgame is properly propagated to their lower layers.
In addition to learning algorithms that follows Algorithm 2, a number of miscellaneous learning mechanisms are applied to SG-based problems in wireless networks. In order to reduce the requirement of information exchange or to achieve convergence, most of these learning mechanisms exploit special properties from the SG. As we have discussed in Section III-B, for the Aloha-like spectrum access problem in CRNs [100] , the near-NE policies of the stochastic access game can be obtained if all the SUs update their local polices with the Logit function (44) and the Q-value at state s is updated following (25) . In this specific scenario, the two-layer learning mechanism based on Q-value updating ensures the convergence to near-NE strategies of the SG without the need of any information exchange. In [158] , [159] , the structural property of a constrained SG is explored. Specifically, consider a utility-minimizing SG G = N , S, ×A i , {c i } i∈N , {d i } i∈N , Pr(s ′ |s, a) with c i as the instantaneous local cost in the objective and d i as the instantaneous local cost in the constraint. If the following assumptions are satisfied with G: A1) the set of policies that satisfy the constraint of the SG is non-empty, A2) the two cost functions c i and d i are multi-modular functions with respect to the actions and the state elements whose transition is a function of the joint local actions, A3) the transition probability Pr(s ′ |s, a) is submodular with respect to the actions and the state elements whose transition is a function of the joint local actions, then G has the following property in the structure of the NE: Based on Theorem 8, the search for NE policies π * i can be reduced to finding a randomized mixture of discrete actions in the finite action set. A policy-iteration-based strategy-learning algorithm can be developed based on the Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) algorithm [160] . In [158] , the rate adaptation problem in a TDMA-based CRN is modeled as an SG with a the latency constraint. In [159] , the joint source-channel rate adaptation problem to transmit layered video in a multiuser wireless local-area network is also formulated as an SG with the latency constraint. In both works, by showing that the assumptions A1-A3 hold in their respective SG-based model, the SPSA algorithm is applied for policy-learning. With the SPSA algorithm, no explicit state value learning is needed, and the local policies are updated with a gradient-based method with random policy perturbation. Given the property A1-A3 in the SG, the SPSA algorithm is proved to converge in distribution to the Kuhn Tucker (KT) pair of the original constrained MDP (Theorem 3 in [158] ).
IV. CHALLENGES AND OPEN ISSUES IN MODEL-FREE LEARNING FOR COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
In this section, we expand our discussion to the challenges and open issues that are yet to be addressed in the area of learning for distributed control and/or wireless networking. In Section IV-A, different aspects of the learning mechanism goals is reviewed, and the potential conflict between these aspects is discussed. In Section IV-B, we propose a problem to cope with the outlier agents who do not (necessarily) follow a given learning rule in a learner set. In Section IV-B, the possibility of transferring experience from one learning scenario/process to a difference learning scenario/process is discussed.
A. The Goal of Learning: Self-Play, Stability and Optimality
Generally, the goal of a perfect self-organized learning mechanism for multi-agent decision processes is to achieve self-play (autonomy), stability and optimality at the same time. However, it has been well-recognized that for multiagent learning (more frequently in a stochastic scenario), better system performance typically incurs more signaling and coordination, thus undermining the self-play structure. Especially, when learning is implemented under the framework of games, achieving any two goals of self-play, stability and network optimality is usually at the cost of undermining the third goal. In recently years, the relationship between the three parties of the goals in multi-agent learning has been discussed in many works, but mostly from a high-level theoretical perspective [8] , [143] , [161] .
In regard to the applications of learning in wireless networks, the situations that have been discovered to keep consistence between a distributed solution and an optimal solution are limited within a small scope. One important case of these situations is the network control problems that is modeled as a potential game [51] . For potential games, the following properties [32] make it possible to achieve convergence to the optimal operation point through adopting the learning algorithms that we discussed in Section III-D:
• Every potential game has at least one pure strategy NE.
• Any global or local maxima of the potential function defined in the game constitutes a pure strategy NE.
Based on the above properties, it is only necessary to prove the uniqueness of the NE in a repeated game for learning processes to achieve optimal operation point with sequential best-response play [35] or no-regret learning. Apart from the works discussed in Section III-D, the applications of distributed learning in potential games in order to achieve global optimization can usually be found in a set of congestion-gamelike problems such as [162] , [163] . However, the potential game requires that local users are able to (implicitly) perceive the utilities of the entire network in order to establish the correspondence between the local utility function and the constructed potential function [51] . Since this requirement is at the cost of trading off the conditions for self-play, it significantly limits the applications for the potential-gamebased learning algorithms. For other model-free distributed learning mechanisms in a multi-device wireless network, how to coordinate the goal of optimality and self-organization when adopting a learning scheme generally remains an open question. As a result, most current studies focus on ensuring convergence to the stable operation point in self-play by allowing a limited level of control-signal exchange. Although there are a few number of already-known conditions that ensure the convergence of a learning algorithm (most of which are applicable to repeated games), for most current studies, whether a stability condition can be found for a learning scheme also remains an open issue. In the literature, the approaches to find the convergence condition of the learning algorithms generally fall into two major categories. For learning processes that can be approximated with a system described as an ODE in continuous time, the typical way of obtaining the convergence condition is to either construct a Lyapunov function (see the example in [123] ) or to directly apply the stochastic-approximation-based analysis of asymptotic pseudo-trajectory (e.g., the analysis of multi-timescale learning [46] ). The analysis of learning using the ODEbased approach can be found in [100] , [116] , [118] , [130] , [164] . For the situations which cannot be easily modeled as an ODE, the contraction-map-based analysis (see the example in [38] ) can be considered as an option. Usually, the contraction map is considered appropriate for the analysis of SG-based learning when modeling the problem is of high complexity [154] . Table V summarizes convergence conditions for the multi-agent learning algorithms discussed in Section III.
In addition to issues associated to finding the convergence condition for a learning scheme, another concern when [62] , [154] ). The reason for this is partly due to the asymptotic convergence condition (if there is any), which requires for most of existing learning algorithms that the states and actions are visited infinitely to ensure the convergence. Given such a limitation, one known approach to analyze the convergence speed of a learning scheme is to view the learning process itself as a discrete time Markov chain. In this approach, the standard Markov chain analysis can be applied to obtain the expected time (number of iterations) to learn before reaching the chain's absorbing state (e.g., the equilibrium point of a repeated game). Such a technique can be found in the recent studies [165] , [166] . In [165] , the Markov-chain-based analysis is used to measure the lower bound of the iterations needed for the Logit-function-based learning scheme to leave a sub-optimal NE in a potential game for gateway selection [165] . In [166] , the same method is employed to track the average iterations that a try-and-error-based learning method needs for reaching the NE of a joint channel-power selection game for the first time. However, such an approach could be computationally intractable when the system/learning scheme is too complicated, and it is yet to be found applicable to the more complex learning algorithms such as those in the SGs.
B. Heterogeneous Learning and Strategic Teaching in the Context of Games
For the existing studies of strategy learning in wireless networks, one most important assumption is that each individual agent abides by the same learning rule (or just uses variable parameters for the same learning scheme). Only with such an assumption, the convergence properties of the learning scheme can be mathematically tracked. However, in may practical scenarios, especially in the scenarios when malicious nodes exist in the network, such an assumption may not be applicable and the malicious nodes may intentionally deviate from the given learning rule. One possible scenario of such a case can be found in a selective-forwarding-based attack-defense game, in which a sophisticated attacker with the ability of selectively forwarding the received packets may wait and abide by the normal packet forwarding rule until some critical packets are sent to it before dropping. To the best knowledge of the authors, currently there are few (if not any) works discussing this situation.
To further demonstrate the situation in which a learner may benefit by deviating from the common learning rule, we introduce the concept of "strategic teaching", which is first discussed in the studies of economic games [167] . With strategic teaching, it is assumed that the game is composed of a number of adaptive players and sophisticated players. An adaptive player learns its strategy following the learning scheme that it is assigned to. By contrast, the sophisticated players are able to adopt a non-myopically optimal strategy and afford a certain short-term loss. Since the adaptive learners will finally learn the best response to a pre-committed strategy by the sophisticated player under the given learning scheme, the sophisticated players will be able to induce the adaptive players to expect some specific patterns of strategies from them in the future [167] . Then, the sophisticated players will be able to take advantage of the behavior patterns that they "teach" the adaptive players, and it has been found that a sufficiently patient strategic teacher can achieve as much utility as from first-play in a Stackelberg game 13 [167] . Thus, the sophisticated play may become a favorable way of strategy adoption for a noncooperative or a malicious node in the wireless network when compared with the way of strictly following the same learning rule.
In [167] , a heuristic, model-free learning method known as Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning (EWAL) [113] is applied to a repeated trust game (a.k.a., lender-borrower game) as the basis of both adaptive learning and sophisticated learning. In that game, M of borrowers try to borrow money from each of a series of N lenders. A lender only makes a one-time binary decision on either Loan or No Loan in a single round out of a N -round game. A borrower makes a series of N binary decisions on Repay or Default regarding each lender it borrows money from after observing the lender's decision. The sequences of the N -round stage-games (also known as supergames) are repeated for many times with a random order of lenders to make decisions with each sequence. In one sequence, one borrower is picked as the common borrower in the game. All the lenders and some of the borrowers play as adaptive players and learn their strategies with EWAL. The rest borrowers are assumed to be dishonest and adopt sophisticated play. It is assumed that the actions and instantaneous payoffs of one player are observable by the other players. For the adaptive players, EWAL use the Logit-function-based rule as in (44) for strategy updating. Instead of directly using the instantaneous/accumulated payoff as the argument of operator exp(·) in the Logit function, EWAL introduces the concept of experience accumulation through reinforcement, and employs two new measurements to build local experience: the observation-equivalents of the past experience (which is similar to the action-frequency estimation in FP) and the attraction to a specific strategy (which is used as the argument of the Logit function) [113] . In the game, the adaptive players apply EWAL twice to build their attraction first within a lending-borrowing sequence (i.e., supergame) and then across the consequent sequences. For the sophisticated borrowers, the learning process does not differentiate between attraction building within a supergame and across different supergames. A sophisticated borrower guesses how the lender learns according the attraction value of the adaptive lender that it observes. Then, the polices of default and repay are sought by incorporating estimated polices of the lenders into the computation of its own sophisticated attraction function (see Section 4.1 of [167] for the details). It has been demonstrated in [167] that by adopting sophisticated play with the attraction updating mechanism based on lender policy estimation, the dishonest borrowers are able to outperform the adaptive borrowers which follow the same EWAL learning rule as the lenders. For simplicity, the mechanism of sophisticated play 13 About the difference of a Stackelberg equilibrium and an NE, the readers are referred to [32] for more details.
can be interpreted as playing additional tricks to the adaptive lenders by repaying frequently enough so if the dishonest borrowers do default it won't lower the belief probability of the lenders about the trustworthiness of these borrowers below a critical level. Such an example provides an important insight into the possible strength of sophisticated play in repeated noncooperative games. However, few studies discuss such an issue in the context of wireless networks. Also, it is generally not clear how strategic teaching with sophisticated play in other forms can be enforced or avoided in the current framework of learning and in what ways it will affect the equilibria that can be reached.
C. Experience Transferring between Heterogeneous Learners
As we note from Section III, one of the substantial benefits of model-free learning is to allow the decision-making entities to learn the strategies from scratch without the apriori detailed knowledge of the wireless network. However, since model-free learning is based on try-and-error, when the network environment has dramatically changed, the learners generally need to start the same learning process from the very beginning. One example of such scenarios can be found in interference mitigation problem for cellular networks, in which mobile stations may enter or leave the network frequently. For most of the existing model-free learning algorithms, such changes in the network topology mean the changes in the MDP model of the network with new dimension of states/actions (if MDP-based learning is adopted), or the transition from an old network-control game to a new one since the set of players is different (if game-based learning is adopted). As a result, when it is required that the decision-making agents to swiftly switch from an old scenario to a new one, the existing learning methods will face great challenge if they can only restart the learning process in the new scenario.
In order to address such a challenge, a natural consideration is to take advantage of the acquired experience of strategy taking which is obtained from the old scenario. We note that such a process is fundamentally different from the experience sharing process in Section III-C, since for the experiencesharing framework such as docitive networks, the parallel and homogeneous learning processes are assumed so the expert agent is able to share its better experience of the same stochastic process with the newcomers. In the scenarios of dramatical environmental changes, the experience transferring paradigm, Transfer Learning (TL) [112] , is considered more appropriate for the tasks of sharing experiences of strategy taking between heterogeneous learning processes. Compared with the experience transferring between homogeneous learners, the motivation of TL is to transfer knowledge (a.k.a. experience) from the well-established learning processes (known as the source tasks) to the newly established learning processes (known as the target tasks) in a different situation. It is worth noting that under the framework of MDP-based learning, TL allows the difference in state spaces, state variables/transition, reward functions and/or sets of actions [112] .
Until recently, TL has been considered difficult to implement for learning in wireless networks. This is mainly Fig. 17 . Architecture of the policy-transfer mechanism in the LTE-A based opportunistic network [168] .
due to the fact that it is difficult to find a proper mapping (either in value-function representation or directly in policy transferring [112] ) to transfer between learning tasks with different action-state representations. For the applications in wireless networks, the example of policy-transferring TL can be found in [168] . In [168] , a highly dynamic opportunistic network which is based on LTE-A is studied. The network topology is assumed to change with time, and the eNodeBs (eNBs) are supposed to be responsible for learning channel allocation under the conditions of mutual interference among the user equipments. The mechanism of policy transferring is adopted on the basis of two model-free learning algorithms: the linear reinforcement learning which employs a simple, linear updating function for state-value updating, and the single-state Q-learning, which applies Q-learning to update a state-less Q-table. For TL, one shot of the changing network topology is considered as a learning phase, then the objective of TL is to apply the experience learned in previous phases (sources) to the similar phases (targets) in the future. The eNBs which attempt to assign channels to the user devices for interference coordination work as the learning agents and obtain the spectrum priority through sorting the Q-table obtained in the current phase in descent order. A policy function is designed to transfer the Q-table learned in a previous phase to the new phase through assigning weights to the source priority table to the target priority table in the new phase. Such a procedure of associating the channel priority in the target task with the channel priority in the source target can be considered as initializing the learning process in the new phase with the transferring knowledge from the old phase. Thereby, the information from transfer learning and distributed learning is combined through weighting the values of channel priorities and the Q-table in the new phase is learned with the given reinforcement learning methods. The policy transferring process in [168] is demonstrated in Figure 17 .
A different approach of applying TL to the wireless networking problems can be found in [169] , where the authors apply TL to a series of actor-critic learning processes to coordinate BS switching/sleeping in a cellular network. In [169] , the possibility of improper guidelines provided by transferred knowledge of an old task to the new task is considered. The actor-critic learning scheme is performed by a BS-operation controller, and is based on a multi-state MDP model for the traffic load of the serving BSs. Compared with [168] , the difference of the TL mechanism in [169] lies in the way of adopting the transferred policies. Instead of using the static Fig. 18 . Architecture of the transfer-actor-critic algorithm [169] .
transferred knowledge for the initialization of the new learning phase, the experience in the new learning phase is divided into two sources: the "native policies" obtained through actorcritic learning and the "exotic policies" obtained as transferred policies from old tasks. The weight of the exotic policies contributing to the overall strategy selection decreases as native learning progresses. The learning-knowledge-transferring process is demonstrated in Figure 18 . It is mathematically proved that regardless of the initial value of the overall policies and the transferred policies, the actor-critic-learning-based algorithm is guaranteed to converge. Also, numerical simulations show that TL does improve the learning speed when compared with the reinforcement learning methods without TL. In the literature, most of the applications of TL in wireless networks are set in the scenarios which can be modeled as MDP-based MAS. With all the existing effort for establishing a general framework of applying TL to learning in wireless networks, the following questions are to be answered: 1) Whether and how can TL be applied between related games (e.g., symmetric games with the same structures of payoffs, actions, but with different sets of players) for accelerating the speed of convergence to the equilibrium? 2) How can we measure the efficiency of knowledge transferring? 3) Apart from policy transferring and value-function transferring, can TL also be applied to heterogeneous learning processes using different learning schemes? In the literature, few studies in wireless networks are found discussing the aforementioned topics. However, discussions on cross-game learning or cross-mechanism learning have already begun in the area of economic games [170] and automatic control [171] . Although the detailed discussion on these topics is beyond the scope of this survey, it is believed that addressing these issues will bring great improvement to the existing learning mechanisms in the CRNs.
V. CONCLUSION
Owing to the distributive nature of wireless networks, model-free learning is especially appropriate for the wireless nodes to adaptively choose their local transmission control strategies in a self-organized manner without much requirement for knowing the network conditions. In this paper, we have provided a comprehensive survey of the state-of-art learning mechanisms in a wide range of scenarios from the loosely couple multi-agent system to the most complicated stochastic games. With a broad-scope analysis and comparisons of the literature, we have focused on learning algorithms that can be categorized within some prototypical schemes. We mainly focus on the following characteristics of the selected learning algorithms: (i) the ability of the learning schemes to achieve optimality/equilibria without the need to know an a-priori model for the environment and (ii) the ability of the learning schemes to achieve optimality/equilibria without the need to obtain the information that is not locally available. In addition to detailed reviews of the existing applications of learning in wireless networks, we have also discussed a variety of open issues that need to be addressed in future research. We hope this survey will serve as a guideline for future research directions to further understand model-free learning mechanisms and expand their application in cognitive wireless networks.
